Scirocco: Latest news from Italy
Scirocco [ʃiˈrɔkko-Scirocco] is a southeasterly, hot strong wind that carries dust and sand across the Mediterranean Sea to Sicily and the north of Italy for often only a few hours. This short info is published since March 2021, and since June 2025 in a new format: Instead of once a month, the new Scirocco timeline provides up-to-date information on the latest political and social developments in Italy relating to the topic of migration.
15 July 2026: “Disappointing and Shameful” – EU Delegation Denied Full Access to Deportation Detention Centre in Albania (Link to PDF)
On 29 June, a group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the left-wing Greens/EFA Group visited the Italian deportation detention centre in Gjadër, Albania. In addition to conducting a general inspection of the facility and assessing the situation of those detained there, the delegation sought to examine whether the centre is currently being transformed into a European offshore return hub.
With the Return Regulation adopted by the European Parliament last month - approved through the alliance of right-wing and conservative parliamentary groups - the establishment of return centres outside the European Union has now been formally legalised. Despite the fact that the centres in Albania have so far proven to be a failure in every respect, the offshore model has thus become an official pillar of the European Union’s migration strategy.
However, these centres are not only fundamentally incompatible with the European principles of the rule of law and human dignity, but also represent a logistical and financial disaster. People who have committed no crime are being detained de facto under inhumane conditions for an indefinite period. Although the centres in Albania have a capacity of up to 1,000 people, no more than 100 individuals have been held in Gjadër at any point since its opening in 2024. According to MEP Cristina Guarda, who was part of the delegation and shared her impressions in a private audio message following the visit, only around 10% of those detained in Gjadër have so far been returned to their countries of origin. In the remaining 90% of cases, return has not been possible for legal or technical reasons, meaning that the continued detention of these individuals lacks any legal basis.
The complete inefficiency of the centres appears even more absurd when considering the costs incurred for their construction and operation. As part of its #Renditicontro (english: #BeAware) campaign, the Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione (TAI) highlighted last month that, according to ActionAid’s 2025 Trattenuti Report, the documented construction costs alone amount to €74 million. In addition, there are substantial personnel and transport costs, as well as ongoing operational expenses, all of which are financed entirely by Italian taxpayers. While independent access to official figures is currently impossible, estimates of the total costs of the two centres to date range between €650 million and €1 billion. Instead of investing in an effective integration policy that respects and upholds the fundamental rights of migrants, Italy and the EU are financing an empty narrative of symbolic border deterrence.
The full extent of the consequences of this narrative became once again unmistakably clear during the MEPs’ visit. Throughout their stay, the delegation was granted only severely restricted access to the facility and to relevant information. The Italian police, responsible for managing the centre, denied entry to two members of the delegation who were not MEPs, without providing any reasonable justification. The remaining MEPs were refused access to the detention cells. In doing so, the authorities not only prevented a comprehensive inspection of the conditions inside the centre but also obstructed direct and independent communication between the parliamentarians and those detained.
Despite what one Italian MEP described as an attempt by the Italian government to “hide the truth”, the actual conditions inside the centres are difficult to conceal. Four people are confined together in small rooms, there are no communal living spaces, numerous cases of self-harm have been reported, six suicide attempts have already been documented, and the misuse of psychotropic medication is widespread. These findings are by no means new. Similar conditions have already been extensively documented through previous inspections of Italian CPRs (Centres for Repatriation) as well as through testimonies from current and former detainees. Likewise, the extensive lack of transparency surrounding information about deportation detention centres has long been recognised as a defining characteristic of Italy’s CPR system.
Dutch MEP Tineke Strik described the visit as “disappointing and shameful”. While the European Commission consistently claims that human rights will be guaranteed in the planned European “Return Hubs,” Members of the European Parliament - who are legally entitled to inspect these facilities - were denied the opportunity to verify whether these rights are actually being respected.
Although, according to the visiting MEPs, the Gjadër centre does not yet appear to be operating as a European “Return Hub,” there is little reason to believe that future European centres will differ substantially from the existing Italian deportation detention centres in practice. All to often European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has described these facilities as a “blueprint” for Europe.
We therefore call for an end to a policy of detention that has increasingly become the dominant paradigm of migration policy not only in Italy but across Europe. Beyond its obvious inefficiency, this policy places an enormous financial burden on society while, above all, causing immeasurable human suffering.
04.07.2026: Beyond Meloni: Further Right Than Meloni: How Vannacci Is Redrawing Italy's Far-Right Landscape (Link to Pdf)
For a long time, Giorgia Meloni considered the right-wing fringe of the Italian electorate to be safely hers. But now competition is forming from even further right: Former military general and MEP Roberto Vannacci unveiled his far-right party Futuro Nazionale and its program on June 14.
Vannacci, who was greeted by his party colleagues as "Julius Caesar", is no longer an unknown figure in Italy. As a candidate for the far-right Lega under Matteo Salvini, he won a seat in the European Parliament with around 500,000 votes. In February, he announced his break with the party to pursue his "dream" and "go far". "Far" in this case means a political agenda shifted even further to the right.
This is clearly reflected in the party program. In a country with one of the most restrictive immigration policies in Europe, one that already cooperates with authoritarian torture regimes to prevent people from entering Europe, Vannacci is demanding that the share of non-Italian citizens be reduced from the current roughly 12 percent to 4 percent. He links this goal to the fascist slogan "Italia agli italiani" (Italy for Italians).
The party also openly promotes sexist positions on social policy. In a country where, after years of feminist struggle, the criminal offense of femicide was only introduced a few months ago and where official figures show that nearly 100 women were killed on the basis of their gender in 2025 alone, with the actual number likely far higher, Vannacci denies the existence of femicide altogether. He described the introduction of the new criminal offense as "brainwashing". Instead, he insists on an alleged equality between men and women and argues that there is therefore no special need to protect women.
In a country that, by international comparison, has one of the lowest rates of homicide and violent crime, Futuro Nazionale places security and defense at the very top of its political priorities. To that end, the party calls for a massive expansion of prisons, law enforcement and surveillance structures.
These neo-fascist, populist demands are finding traction in an Italy suffering from drastic social cuts and instability under the Meloni government. Within a short period of time, around 100,000 people are said to have already joined the party, while polls now place Futuro Nazionale at close to five percent. With that, the party could become a serious challenge to Fratelli d'Italia's dominance in the upcoming parliamentary elections in spring.
Yet the hope for social resistance and solidary counter-movements has not been lost. On the contrary, they are strong and remain so. In recent weeks, large antifascist protests against the founding of Vannacci's party took place in several Italian cities. On June 13, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people took to the streets in Rome under the banner "Fuck Remigration", sending a loud signal against fascism and Italy's racist deportation policies. In Florence as well, around 3,000 demonstrators stood against a "stroll" event organized by approximately 300 supporters of Futuro Nazionale.
Once again, this makes clear: far-right forces in Europe are on the rise, but the counter-movements remain loud and tightly organized. There is a great deal of hope, and many networks, organizations, and groups that are actively working to combat fascism and oppose the neo-fascist political landscape in Italy and around the world.
18.06.2026 CEAS Implementation on the Fast Track – Italy’s Decree Policy at the Expense of the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (Link to PDF)
Once again, the Italian government is using the pretext of “urgency” and “emergency intervention” to implement the CEAS reform not through the regular parliamentary legislative process, but by decree. In doing so, it not only bypasses the necessary democratic debate, but simultaneously disregards fundamental rule-of-law principles that are a central prerequisite for the legitimacy and effectiveness of political decisions - a failing that weighs particularly heavily given the scope of the reform and the foreseeable significant interference with the fundamental rights of People on the Move (PoM).
The Decreto Legge (DL 100/2026), adopted by the Council of Ministers on 4 June and entering into force on 12 June, bears the title “Urgent Measures in the Field of Justice and for the Implementation of the European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum of 14 May 2024.” It takes over and replaces parts of the legislative bill (No. 1869) on migration, which was already adopted by the Italian government in February and is currently before the Senate in its first reading for examination by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. While the legislative bill - covering general provisions on CPRs, the so-called “naval blockade,” new grounds for expulsion, and restrictions on family reunification - is following the regular parliamentary route, the decree law concerns in particular the new asylum border procedures introduced as part of the reform. To ensure these could enter into force in time for the implementation of CEAS, the Italian government chose not to await the conclusion of the regular legislative process, instead adopting the decree on an expedited basis.
While Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi describes the provisions contained in the decree as merely “organisational in nature” civil society organisations such as Amnesty International have sharply criticised the government’s approach. The decree, they warn, carries the “concrete risk of expanding administrative discretionary powers that can lead to dangerous automatisms incompatible with the principle of individual examination of asylum applications prescribed by the EU Pact, as well as with effective judicial guarantees.”
Concretely, the decree first regulates the individual procedural steps of an asylum application - from the initial expression of intent through registration to the formal submission - as well as the documents to be issued to applicants.
With regard to the new asylum border procedures, which from now on will be mandatory for persons from countries of origin with low recognition rates, for persons with forged documents, and for persons classified as a security risk, the decree enshrines in national law the procedural duration of up to twelve weeks provided for under CEAS. It also creates the possibility of accommodating those affected during this period in special border or transit centres as well as in other facilities designated by the state. In addition, the legal construct of a “fiction of non-entry” is introduced. The decree further provides for the possibility of administrative deprivation of liberty of up to 72 hours, serving the purposes of identity verification, “security checks”, and the collection of biometric data. Asylum seekers may furthermore be required to reside at a specific location and to remain reachable by the authorities throughout the entire procedure. The competent authorities will also assess whether there is a risk of a person absconding from the procedure. In such cases, additional conditions or even detention may be ordered.
A further focus of the decree lies on the collection and processing of biometric data. Highly sensitive information such as fingerprints and facial images of migrants is collected and fed into the European EURODAC system. Through enhanced interconnection of European databases, identity verification is to be facilitated and the movements of persons within the European Union more effectively tracked. At the same time, comprehensive health, security, and vulnerability screening is carried out at the borders, particularly for persons entering irregularly or brought ashore following sea rescues.
The provisions on labour market access for asylum seekers are also tightened. In future, applicants will only be permitted to take up employment after a waiting period of 90 days. The decree furthermore expands the grounds for the accelerated rejection of asylum applications. Grounds cited include cases of manifest unfoundedness, the submission of forged documents, and the implicit withdrawal of an application. This last provision is particularly concerning, as it does not require an explicit withdrawal by the applicant. Instead, it suffices for the competent authorities to conclude that the person concerned is no longer interested in pursuing the procedure. Such “unwillingness” may be inferred, for example, if the person is not present at the stated place of residence or fails to provide certain information.
To describe the provisions of the decree as mere “organisational measures” is therefore nothing less than a cynical trivialisation of their far-reaching impact on the fundamental and human rights of People on the Move. The measures carry the potential for significant restrictions on the rights of asylum seekers, enabling increased surveillance, more frequent restrictions on liberty up to and including detention, impeded access to effective legal protection, and considerable data protection risks in connection with the expanded collection of biometric data.
The adoption of the decree should not be viewed as an isolated political event, but rather as part of a national implementation process for the CEAS reforms that has been characterised by far-reaching opacity from the outset. Although member states were granted two years to transpose the European provisions already adopted in 2024, the Italian government has largely kept its implementation plans under wraps. This has not only hindered informed exchange between government and civil society, but has also curtailed the ability of civil society actors to adequately assess the consequences of the new rules and to prepare for the tightening of conditions that is to be expected.
In light of the foreseeable far-reaching restrictions on fundamental rights protection and the considerable risk of unlawfully denying vulnerable and protection-seeking persons their legitimate right to protection, the implementation of the CEAS reforms under conditions of near-total exclusion of the public and through an accelerated procedure must be regarded as a scandal for democracy and the rule of law in Italy. A state that claims to uphold these principles internationally must give them unreserved effect with respect to all people and must not stop at its own borders.
26.06.2026: Return Hubs: The EU Disposes of Its Responsibility (Link to the PDF)
After months of negotiations, the EU Council, the Parliament, and the Commission have agreed on the most significant change to European migration policy in decades. Just a few days after the implementation of the CEAS, the political center joined far-right forces and voted for a fundamental overhaul of EU return procedures. At the heart of this overhaul are the so-called 'Return Hubs', which are detention centres located outside the EU. These hubs are intended for individuals without valid residency status. After the bill was passed, lawmakers from the right wing, including German AfD lawmakers, clapped along to chants of “Send them back”.
Until now, people with rejected asylum applications could only be deported to their countries of origin or to states with which they have a demonstrable connection. As early as March, representatives from Germany, Austria, Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands met with the explicit intention of loosening exactly these rules. The blueprint for the planned tightening measures is Italy's Albania Deal.
The agreed regulations still require formal confirmation by the EU Parliament and member states, and could enter into force within the coming weeks. Under the new law, refugees could be forcibly transferred to return hubs in third countries, where they would await final deportation, even if they have no connection to those countries. In practice, these facilities are equivalent to prisons: those held there would not be permitted to leave the premises. This would apply to minors too; even children could be detained there alongside their parents.
In addition, the maximum detention period for individuals awaiting deportation would increase from six months to up to two years. For individuals classified as a "security risk", indefinite detention could become possible, despite the term remaining deliberately vague. One EU official put it plainly: "The goal is to send people to their country of origin. If this is not possible, we would wait until it is possible.". As a result, people could be held for months or even years in a country entirely foreign to them, solely on the basis of a rejected asylum application.
Another element of the regulations is the obligation for refugees to cooperate fully with authorities. In practice, this could grant local police and migration agencies sweeping powers to search individuals and "relevant premises", yet another deliberately broad formulation. Consequences could include home raids, seizure of phones or laptops, and severe violations of privacy. Once again, the sole justification is often a rejected asylum application. These measures are increasingly reminiscent of the repressive tactics employed by ICE. At the same time, entry bans would be drastically tightened. The existing five-year maximum could be increased to ten years, and for those falling under the broadly defined "security risk" category, lifetime bans would become conceivable.
Just weeks ago, 17 EU member states signed the Chișinău Declaration, calling for a broader interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically targeting Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The motivation is obvious: the planned outsourcing of deportation procedures to third countries directly conflicts with this fundamental standard, given the far more precarious detention conditions and severely limited legal protections in those states.
Similar outsourcing models have already proven inhumane, costly and counterproductive. Time and again, they have resulted in refugees being exposed to violence, abuse, exploitation and death.
By transferring people to non-EU states, the EU increasingly evades its direct responsibility, offloads oversight and accountability onto third countries, and reproduces colonial structures. The current regulation, the Chișinău Declaration and the CEAS are the ultimate consequence of an increasingly restrictive EU asylum policy: detention periods are expanding, safeguards are being dismantled, and the risk of serious human rights violations is growing. It is also the clearest sign yet that right-wing and far-right narratives no longer merely influence European migration policy, they now drive it.
Detaining people in closed facilities outside Europe deepens trauma, isolation and the stripping of rights. Instead of keeping those seeking protection out of Europe at any cost and outsourcing responsibility to third countries, what is needed are real investments in reception, care and integration. Stay informed about the developments surrounding the CEAS implementation and stand up against the European deportation system and the ongoing erosion of fundamental rights.
10.06.2026: The UN Raises Alarm: Italy fails to implement the UN Convention against Torture (Link to the PDF)
Italy is facing scrutiny over its compliance with the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In its latest concluding observations, the UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) identified serious shortcomings in Italy’s implementation of the convention, including Italy’s definition of torture, the prison conditions and Italy’s migration policies. These concerns echo longstanding criticism raised by civil society organizations and come at a time when European migration policies increasingly prioritize deterrence and forced returns over protection and safeguarding of people on the move.
The UNCAT was established in 1984 to monitor the implementation of the UN Convention against Torture and is comprised of ten independent experts. In their concluding observations on Italy, the UNCAT criticises many aspects of Italy’s migration policies that have long been under criticism by civil society organizations: the agreements with Libya and Albania, the breach of the right to non-refoulement, the inhumane conditions in the Pre-Removal Detention Centers (CPRs) and the criminalization of civil sea rescue operations. Italy must provide information on the actions it will take in response to these recommendations by May 1, 2027, which will be reviewed in the UNCAT’s next periodic report.
Another major gap in Italy’s implementation of the UN Convention was highlighted by the Italian Network for the Support of Torture Survivors (RESST): the failure to uphold the right to rehabilitation for torture victims. This issue is particularly relevant in the case of people on the move arriving in Italy from Libya or Tunisia, places where human rights abuses and torture of migrants are well-documented. According to an estimate by Avvenire, 17,000 victims of abuse and torture have arrived in Italy in 2025 alone. However, the report found that beyond the treatment of externally visible vulnerabilities, rehabilitation opportunities for torture victims are scarce. While guidelines do exist, they are found to be poorly implemented, if at all. This is reflected by the fact that CAS facilities (the most common reception facility for people on the move) are not required to have a psychologist. Meanwhile, the SAI reception system, which is intended to accommodate vulnerable migrants, lacks sufficient spaces.
These reports were published at a time when both Italian and European politics are further turning toward dehumanizing policies. In a recent Scirocco we reported on the Council of Europe’s Chișinău Declaration, which aims at reinterpreting the article of the European Convention on Human Rights that prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. This reinterpretation would result in weaker human rights protection for non-EU citizens. Furthermore, the return regulations, which were agreed upon last week by the EU, will further undermine the right to non-refoulment. In this context, the UN and RESST reports must be understood not only as a criticism of current politics but also a warning-signal about Italy’s and the EU’s plans to further erode safeguarding against torture and ill-treatment. Although the committee’s recommendations are not legally binding, they increase international pressure on the Italian government and strengthen legal and advocacy efforts.
12.06.2026: Implementation of CEAS: How the New Asylum Law Reform Restricts the Fundamental Rights of People on the Move (Link to the PDF)
Today, the tightening of European asylum law in the form of the new Common European Asylum System (CEAS) comes into force across Europe. It was adopted by the EU on April 10, 2024, following more than eight years of negotiations. While we have been reporting on developments surrounding CEAS for some time, we would like to use today’s implementation as an opportunity to take a closer look at the biggest changes the reform brings and the impact this will have on the rights of people on the move.
Through the tightening to the European asylum law, unlawful practices that have been in use for years in countries such as Italy and Greece are being legalized and normalized. While the old asylum law was primarily based on directives, thus leaving member states considerable leeway in implementation, most of the regulations under the CEAS reform have been enacted in the form of regulations. From today these are binding and uniform in every member state’s law. The most significant changes concern the screening procedure, the asylum border procedure, and the “safe” third country rule. These changes are discussed in more detail below.
The Screening Procedure
The screening procedure is enshrined in the new Screening Regulation. Every person who enters the EU irregularly across an external border must undergo it. During the procedure, the person is identified, a preliminary health and vulnerability assessment is conducted, and biometric data is collected and recorded in the EURODAC database. In addition, an assessment is made as to whether the person could pose a “threat to internal security”. Overall, the procedure may last no more than seven days at the EU’s external border and only three days within the EU. During this brief period, the course is set for which procedure the person will subsequently be referred to: the regular asylum procedure, the asylum border procedure, or an accelerated procedure. During the procedure at the external border, a legal fiction of “non-entry” applies; thus, legally, the person is not in the EU. As a result, individuals have limited access to fundamental rights that would otherwise apply, and both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Geneva Convention on Refugees are circumvented.
The screening procedure severely restricts the right to personal liberty, as individuals are effectively detained during the process. This right is enshrined, among other places, in Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) and in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The right to legal protection (Art. 10 UDHR) and the right to an effective remedy (Art. 47 CFR) are also not guaranteed, as no legal remedy is provided for during the screening procedure. This is justified by the claim that no decision is made in the screening procedure that directly affects the rights of the person concerned. However, this does not correspond to reality, as the nature of the asylum procedure is determined here.
The assessment of vulnerability in such a short time is also highly questionable. Many forms of vulnerability and disability, such as the effects of trauma or invisible disabilities, are not immediately apparent and require more time to be recognized. At the same time, these determinations have a significant impact on the further treatment and classification of the person seeking protection. Furthermore, there are concerns regarding data protection. During the screening process, biometric data is collected starting at age 6, and this data will also be accessible to local police authorities.This poses a risk of data misuse, and could result in a sharp rise of cases of racial profiling. This is inconsistent with the right to the protection of personal data (Art. 8 CFREU) and the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 7 CFREU, Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
The Asylum Border Procedure and the Accelerated Procedure
Both procedures are established in the Asylum Procedure Regulation. The aim of the asylum border procedure is to detain people on the move near the border in order to facilitate their removal in the event of a negative decision and to prevent them from traveling on to other Member States. During the asylum border procedure, the legal fiction of “non-entry” continues to apply.
The asylum border procedure is mandatory for persons who are nationals of a third country with a recognition rate of less than 20% (e.g., Turkey or Russia), who are accused of intentionally deceiving the authorities or destroying their identity documents, or who are alleged to pose a threat to national security. In addition, a border asylum procedure may also be applied if the asylum application was filed in a transit zone or at the border, or if the person was apprehended in connection with an illegal border crossing or rescued from distress at sea. These broad criteria provide Member States with considerable leeway to expand the scope of border procedures.
The purpose of the procedure is to assess the admissibility of the asylum application, particularly with regard to the possibility of returning the individual to their home country or to a “safe” third country. The border procedure is similar to the regular asylum procedure, but with shorter time limits. The asylum application must be filed within five days, and the procedure may last no longer than twelve weeks. During the procedure, individuals at the borders remain detained in closed centers, which severely restricts their right to liberty (Art. 6 CFREU, Art. 3 UDHR). Furthermore, the right to legal protection (Art. 10 UDHR) and the right to an effective remedy (Art. 47 UDHR) are not sufficiently guaranteed, as is the case of the screening procedure. Free legal information is not automatically provided, but only upon request. While there is, in principle, a right to legal representation, the costs must be borne by the asylum seeker themselves. For many asylum seekers, this poses a significant hurdle and hinders access to effective legal protection. The prohibition on discrimination based, among other things, on country of origin, as enshrined in the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Art. 3 GCR), is also undermined by the border procedure. In particular, the 20% rule and the expanded concept of “safe” countries of origin make it more difficult for marginalized groups from these countries — such as queer individuals or those facing political persecution — to present their individual stories of flight. The blanket classification of entire groups of origin increases the risk of unlawful deportations. This also violates the principle of non-refoulement (Art. 33 GCR).
The accelerated procedure is largely similar to the border procedure, with the difference that it does not take place at external borders. Here, too, shortened deadlines apply, and access to legal protection is severely restricted.
The “safe” third-country rule
In February of this year, with the votes of the far-right factions in the European Parliament, a tightening of the “safe” third-country rule was adopted. Asylum applications can be rejected on the grounds that the individuals could have sought asylum in a so-called “safe” third country, without a comprehensive substantive review of the grounds for asylum. The threshold for classifying a country as “safe” is extremely low. Ratification of the Geneva Convention on Refugees may be sufficient for this purpose, though it is not strictly required if the state can guarantee so-called “effective protection.” Furthermore, individual regions within a state may also be classified as “safe.”
While a direct connection between the affected person and such a third country was originally required (such as a prolonged stay), this requirement was relaxed in February 2026. Now, merely transiting through a third country may suffice, or, if there is a corresponding agreement with the third country, no connection is necessary at all to deport a person there. This regulation opens the door to outsourcing asylum procedures to third countries and increases the risk of deportation to countries where the human rights of those affected are not adequately protected. This can further undermine the principle of non-refoulement (Art. 33 of the Geneva Convention). This regulation does not apply to unaccompanied minors.
Minors
The CEAS reform also significantly restricts the rights of minors. Minors are generally not exempt from either the screening procedure or the asylum border procedure. They are required to be accompanied by adult family members or special representatives. Minors can thus also be detained in border centers for up to three months and, under the accelerated procedure, are effectively treated the same as adults. Unaccompanied minors must undergo a border procedure if they are classified as a “security threat”. The shortened deadlines make it difficult to properly appoint a guardian and provide adequate legal representation for unaccompanied minors. This treatment of minors contradicts the principle of the best interests of the child, which is enshrined in Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This is clearly violated in the CEAS measures concerning minors.
Conclusion
The tightening of asylum law nullifies or circumvents numerous rights of people on the move that are enshrined in international and European law. The reform makes it clear that right-wing narratives are increasingly taking precedence over human rights in Europe. CEAS is primarily aimed at further restricting migration and deporting people as directly as possible from the border. This makes access to protection considerably more difficult. Precisely for this reason, it is more important today than ever not to accept these political developments without protest, but to mount political and legal resistance. International law provides a central point of reference for denouncing these injustices.
29 May 2026: Economically Welcome, Politically Undesirable: The Italian Migration Paradox (Link to PDF)
Half a million work visas — alongside an increasingly restrictive migration policy and rhetoric: under Giorgia Meloni, Italy exemplifies a tension that is far from new, but rather part of a longer-standing European logic of selective migration, one that has become particularly visible under her government. While the administration continues to criminalize irregular migration and obstruct civilian sea rescue operations, it simultaneously opens pathways for legal labour migration. Faced with labour shortages and a demographic crisis that poses an existential threat to the country’s economic stability, Italy remains deeply dependent on immigration. This creates an ambivalence within the Italian migration context that reveals a fundamental paradox: people migrating to Italy are categorised and treated differently. While some are actively recruited to counter labour shortages and economic decline, others are deliberately excluded, criminalised, or abandoned to precarious conditions.
1. Italy’s Demographic Situation
Recent data published by the national statistics institute ISTAT (2025) paints a serious picture of Italy’s demographic situation. The birth rate has fallen to a historic low of 1.14 children per woman. In 2025, 355,000 births were recorded against 652,000 deaths. The fact that the total population nevertheless remains relatively stable at around 59 million inhabitants is solely due to migration. Without a positive migration balance of approximately 296,000 people, the population would have declined dramatically over the past year. Italy is now the oldest country in the EU, with a median age of 49.1 years. Particularly alarming is the projected decline of the population aged 15–64, which is expected to shrink by more than one fifth (over 20%) by 2050. This demographic contraction poses a severe threat to both economic growth and the sustainability of the pension system.
2. Labour Market: Structural Dependence on Migrant Labour
The Italian economy has long become structurally dependent on foreign labour. According to the Ministry of Labour’s annual report, migrants already accounted for 10.5% of total employment in 2025 (approximately 2.5 million people). In certain sectors, their importance is considerably higher:
- Collective and personal services (including care work): 30.9%
- Agriculture: 20%
- Hotels and restaurants: 18.5%
- Construction: 16.9%
Particularly in the field of elderly care, an article published by Il Foglio in December 2025 estimated that by early 2026 approximately 72.2% of care workers would be people with a migration background. Overall, demand for migrant labour is increasing significantly across numerous sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, 54.7% of industrial and service companies report difficulties finding sufficient staff, despite planning to hire more than one million migrant workers in 2024 alone.
It must also be acknowledged that a significant proportion of migrant workers are employed under precarious and informal conditions. According to a 2025 report by InfoMigrants, around half of domestic and care workers in Italy are employed without regular residence or employment status. This illustrates the extent to which key sectors of the Italian economy rely on often invisible and legally insecure migrant labour — a dependence that simultaneously creates conditions for exploitation.
3. Government Strategy: Massive Visa Expansion Despite Hardline Rhetoric
In an effort to stabilise the labour market, the Meloni government announced plans to issue nearly 500,000 new work visas for non-EU citizens between 2026 and 2028. These visas are to be allocated through the so-called Decreto Flussi, which regulates annual entry quotas for foreign workers. This follows a previously approved quota of more than 450,000 visas for the period 2023–2025.
The OECD further emphasises that the government has accelerated administrative procedures, for example through the digitalisation of contracts and the reduction of waiting periods for labour market tests to only eight days. At the same time, access for highly qualified workers through the EU Blue Card system, as well as for digital nomads, has been facilitated. Economic associations such as Coldiretti have explicitly welcomed these measures, as sectors such as agriculture and food production are becoming increasingly dependent on migrant labour.
4. The Gap Between Quotas and Reality
Despite these increases, think tanks and public institutions continue to criticise the fact that quotas for legal immigration remain insufficient. Demand for labour significantly exceeds the number of available visas. This becomes particularly visible during the so-called “Click Days”: on these days, companies may submit online applications for work visas, yet applications consistently exceed available quotas within an extremely short time frame. The Osservatorio Conti Pubblici even estimates that Italy will require at least ten million immigrants by 2050 in order to halt population decline and maintain its current population size.
Reduced to its core, this is precisely the paradox upon which Italy’s positioning and narratives surrounding migration appear almost contradictory: politically and rhetorically, Italy combats a form of migration upon which it is simultaneously economically and socially dependent. Immigration functions as a demographic shock absorber, yet its effects are increasingly diminishing due to both the ageing of migrants already living in Italy and the emigration of young Italians.
Without a further expansion of legal migration pathways and more effective integration policies, the country’s public finances and social cohesion risk further destabilisation under the pressure of the demographic crisis. At the same time, debates surrounding labour migration and declining birth rates reveal the extent to which migration in Italy is often viewed primarily through an economic lens — and instrumentalised accordingly. Statements such as those made by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, who argued that regular migration is necessary to counter labour shortages and declining birth rates, demonstrate that migrants frequently become visible only when they are considered economically necessary.
What often disappears from public discourse, however, are the people themselves and the violence produced by this system: people who die or go missing on their journey to Europe; children arriving without their parents or families being torn apart; and those who, after arrival, live in bureaucratic uncertainty and social isolation because they do not fit into the “right” category of migrant. The consequences of these restrictive dynamics include the non-recognition of qualifications and university degrees, restricted or absent work permits, and additional structural barriers that ultimately push many individuals into exploitative and informal employment relationships. Remarkably little attention is paid — both politically and socially — to these people and their lived realities in Italy.
It is precisely here that the disconnect between dominant European migration narratives and social reality becomes evident. Migration is not only controlled but also strategically instrumentalised: people in vulnerable situations are treated as economic resources while simultaneously being denied dignity, security, and political visibility. They are expected to help Italy overcome its demographic crisis, yet when it comes to guaranteeing protection, rights, and a dignified life for people in need, many are ultimately left to fend for themselves.
¹ The report does not explicitly specify who is included in this category; it is therefore assumed that it refers to all individuals without Italian citizenship.
25.05.2026: 4 Years of Prison for Videos About the Genocide in Gaza - The Criminalisation of Palestinian Resistance Through Meloni’s Security Package (Link to PDF)
"My name is Ahmad Salem, I was born on April 8, 2001 in Lebanon. I am Palestinian. I came to Europe because I need to help my family. I am not a terrorist. I have lost 73 members of my family in Gaza, they are all buried under the rubble."
With these words, Ahmad Salem begins his testimony in the courtroom of Campobasso, the capital of Molise, on April 14 - the final day of a six-day trial. Shortly afterward, he is escorted out of the courtroom by nine Carabinieri. The verdict: four years in prison for alleged self-directed training for terrorist purposes. The evidence: possession and sharing of images and videos about the genocide in Gaza.
Ahmad was born in al-Baddawi, one of twelve Palestinian refugee camps in northern Lebanon, and left the country to seek international protection in Europe. When he filed his asylum application at the Campobasso police headquarters last May, the then 24 year old was taken into pre-trial detention and transferred to the high-security wing of the Rossano-Corigliano prison - also known as "Italy's Guantanamo."
Since Ahmad had lost his identity documents while fleeing, he showed the officers photos of the documents on his phone. They then decided to search the entire memory of his device and found images and videos related to the conflict in Palestine, including footage of armed resistance attacks on Israeli military vehicles as well as material documenting the genocide in Gaza.
The mere possession of these images, along with the sharing of a TikTok video in which Ahmad condemned the silence of Arab, Islamic, and European states in the face of the ongoing genocide in Gaza and called for mobilization against it, was deemed sufficient by the Italian judiciary to find him guilty on two counts:
- Incitement to commit a criminal offense under § 414 of the Italian Penal Code, and
- Self-training for terrorist purposes under § 270d of the Italian Penal Code.
The offense of possessing terrorist material was only introduced in April 2025 through Law 80/2025 as part of the first "security package" of the Meloni government, and had drawn widespread criticism. Under this law, it is no longer necessary to prove membership in a terrorist organization, nor to have undertaken any concrete training activities. Instead, the mere possession of materials that could potentially be used for terrorist acts is sufficient to fall under the offense.
The videos on Ahmad's phone, however, were not tutorials on how to make bombs. Rather, they were depictions of the ongoing conflict in Gazam, content that had already been widely circulated in international media as part of reporting on the genocide. The fact that the very same videos also published by major Italian outlets such as La Repubblica, La Stampa, and Railews were used in Ahmad's case as evidence of potentially terrorist activity amounts, according to his attorney Rossi Albertini, to nothing less than "the result of ethnic prejudice" and the expression of a "hostile and Islamophobic attitude" on the part of the court. Immediately following the verdict, the defense announced it would appeal.
Ahmad's case is the first known proceeding in which Article 270d has been applied. The ruling thus sets a dangerous precedent for the criminalization of political solidarity in Italy, and at the same time fits into a broader structural trend increasingly observable across Europe. One only has to think of the cases of Mohammad Hannoun, Mohamed Shanin, or Anan Yaeesh, to recognize the underlying pattern: Palestinians and pro-Palestinian activists are facing growing surveillance, raids, and prosecution solely on the basis of their speech, their associations, or their possession of political content.
"If the same reasoning were applied to a ukrainian citizen, no one would think of convicting him for possessing images of war", so Albertini. Defense and opposition alike agree: Ahmad Salem's only ‘guilt’ is that he is Palestinian.
22.05.2026: The Chișinău Declaration: Europe’s abandonment of universal human rights protection (Link to PDF)
An explicit and deeply concerning objective was at the intention of last Friday’s meeting of the Council of Europe in Chișinău, Moldova; the weakening of protections for migrants in Europe. The meeting was preceded by an open letter published last year, initiated by Italy and Denmark and signed by nine member states, calling for a revision of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In the letter, the states demanded “greater room for manoeuvre at national level” as well as “innovative solutions” to combat irregular migration, fully in line with the colonial and propagandistic Italy-Albania agreement, such as the externalization of “return hubs” and agreements with non-EU transit states.
While the letter initially had no immediate consequences, a declaration was signed last Friday in Chișinău that builds upon the same political demands. It advocates for a new interpretation of the ECHR under which the rights of non-EU citizens would receive weaker protection. One consequence would be the legalization of deportations of convicted non-EU nationals, even in cases involving family separation or degrading detention conditions in their countries of origin.
The declaration specifically targets the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the interpretation of Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. In the future, exceptions to human rights protections could be permitted in certain cases, with national authorities, rather than the Court itself deciding when such exceptions apply. This risks reinforcing a familiar pattern of framing human rights and national security as inherently conflicting, and using the vague, open-ended interpretation of "national security" can to further erode the rights of migrants.
Although this alarming declaration is not legally binding, it exerts political pressure on courts and authorities. This pressure is also directed at the negotiations on new migration policy regulations, which are currently in the trilogue phase and will resume in the European Parliament next week. The goal is to reach a final agreement by summer. The moment we warned about just a few weeks ago in our Scirocco has now arrived. The dangerous pattern of the Italian migration system has now officially succeeded in becoming a model for other EU member states.
While Meloni is celebrated as a heroine on social media, the gravity of the declaration is increasingly being overshadowed. As the ECHR expert group Agora states in a recent declaration, the adoption of this text represents a historic turning point: for the first time, the Council of Europe is explicitly pursuing the long-term restriction of human rights protections for specific groups of people. Another clear sign of the EU’s ongoing retreat from the idea of universal human rights protection.
20.05.2026: The extraordinary reception centres – an extraordinary system becomes the norm (PDF Link)
On 30 April 2026, the State Police and the Prefecture's Inspectorate closed two extraordinary reception centres (CAS) located in the Leonforte area in Sicily due to serious sanitary issues. The occupants were transferred to other facilities in the vicinity. A newly published report by ActionAid and openpolis shows that this case is not an exception but reflects a widespread pattern.
The report “La frontiera, ovunque” from April 2026 (The Border Everywhere) debunks the Italian government’s narrative of a “migration crisis” and instead demonstrates how this state of “emergency” is being fabricated through political decisions. The system of extraordinary reception centres (CAS), originally created as a temporary solution to fill gaps in ordinary reception facilities during periods of high arrivals, has become the norm. In 2024, the CAS facilities hosted 71.9% of people in the reception system, while the Reception and Integration System (SAI), which is intended to be the ordinary system, hosted only 24.7%.
CAS facilities offer fewer services and inclusion pathways than the SAI system, trapping people in precarious situations without adequate access to integration support. The report also highlights a strong trend towards larger facilities and the growth of profit-oriented operators. As a result, centres increasingly focus not on providing high-quality services to their residents but rather on cutting costs and improving operational efficiency. This further standardises their operation and ignores the needs of individuals. Consequently, the focus of the system is shifting from providing reception and integration support to mere containment of People on the Move.
Following this trend several severe issues emerge. Many CAS facilities are overcrowded – in 2024, almost one thousand out of a total of six thousand centres were operating over capacity – while centres in other regions still had many free spaces available. In 2023, at least 823 unaccompanied minors were accommodated in facilities for adults. Although this is allowed under decree 133/2023 only under exceptional circumstances where there is no space in adequate reception facilities, the practice appears to become normalised. Even though the decree allows only temporary accommodation for up to 90 days, longer periods are becoming increasingly common, with the longest recorded stay reaching 1,413 days. ActionAid reports that the accommodation of minors in adult centres occurs even when places are available in centres dedicated to their needs. This exposes some of the most vulnerable people to even greater risks and limits their access to education and age-appropriate services.
The case of Leonforte has shown that inspections are extremely important in ensuring that centres adhere to minimum standards. However, the report highlights that inspections cover only 19.1% of facilities, with significant geographical disparities. Moreover, even when inspections are carried out, they are often limited to formal checks.
More recently, in Vignanello, a town in Lazio, opposition has formed against government plans to build a new CAS facility in a former nightclub located in an industrial area. They have collected over 2000 signatures in the town and surrounding municipalities against these plans. Instead, local actors are calling for the investment and expansion of the SAI system, including widespread integration, training and job placement projects. They oppose the creation of new spaces of segregation and instead advocate for policies based on genuine integration, developed together with the local communities and their social realities.
The report and the cases of Leonforte and Vignanello illustrate how the Italian government is using the narrative of a “migration crisis” to justify exceptional measures within the Italian reception system and the lowering of standards. This has allowed a system intended only for exceptional situations to become the norm. As a result, some of the most vulnerable people arriving in Italy are exposed to greater risks, preventing People on the Move from fully accessing the rights to which they are entitled.
08.05.2026: The Panopticon of Castel Volturno: Architecture of Exclusion (PDF Link)
In Castel Volturno, a new detention and deportation center is planned that marks a troubling turning point in Italian migration policy. With a budget of more than €41 million, the facility is designed according to the Panopticon model developed by Jeremy Bentham. Its architecture strongly resembles that of a high-security prison: radially arranged housing units, a barred circular walkway for constant surveillance, and high fences and walls. The design therefore aims at permanent control and the spatial isolation of those detained. According to Ristretti Orizzonti, official documents explicitly use the term confinamento (“confinement”) for the first time.
Equally troubling is the security narrative reflected in statements by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. Leisure and communal activities are described as tools to prevent “situations of discomfort” that could foster hostility. In this framing, such activities are not understood primarily as rights, needs, or elements of a dignified everyday life, but as instruments to pacify and manage detained people. Migrants are thus implicitly portrayed as potentially dangerous, disruptive, or hostile, while the architecture of the CPR is presented as a rational and preventive response.
This logic also appears in the categorization of detainees. Particularly controversial is the proposal that people who have not committed criminal offenses, but who are held in an administrative limbo, should be divided into different levels of deprivation of liberty. These levels would depend partly on a person’s legal status and partly on an attributed degree of “hostility.” In this respect, the facility recalls historical prison models in which detainees were placed in hierarchical categories ranging from stricter to supposedly more lenient conditions of confinement.
Why is this project so problematic? Beyond ethical criticism — including from church representatives who regard it as a violation of human dignity — there are also ecological and financial concerns. The center is planned within the protected natural area Parco La Piana, an important resting site for migratory birds, apparently without a prior environmental impact assessment. It also raises the question of why public funds are being invested in a structure of confinement and control rather than in social services, schools, healthcare, or integration measures.
The CPR in Castel Volturno is therefore more than a local construction dispute. It represents a policy that treats migration not as a social, economic, and human-rights reality, but primarily as a security issue. A just migration policy would instead focus on legal pathways of entry, social protection, labor rights, and inclusion. What is being built instead is an infrastructure of exclusion that systematically discriminates against migrants and frames them as a security risk to be managed, controlled, and removed. The problem therefore lies not only in the architecture of the CPR, but also in a political discourse that reinforces the systematic criminalization of migration. The planned center in Castel Volturno embodies this logic in a particularly visible way.
07.05.2026: The Italy-Albania deal: “Compatible with EU law” — but at what cost? (PDF Link)
The Italy–Albania protocol on migration “is compatible with EU legislation” only insofar as migrants’ rights are “fully protected.” This is the conclusion of Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou at the European Court of Justice. But what does “compatible with EU law” mean in practice—and at what cost? Emiliou suggests that, “in principle,” both the protocol and the relevant Italian legislation could be considered compatible with EU law, particularly the Return Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive.
The ECJ had already examined the case in August last year, following a referral from the Court of Rome, which has repeatedly questioned the legality of detaining migrants rescued in the Mediterranean and transferred to Albania on the basis that they come from countries Italy deems “safe,” such as Egypt and Bangladesh. A final ruling is still pending, but the Advocate General’s opinion may significantly influence the outcome.
This makes it crucial to scrutinize the realities on the ground. Emiliou himself stressed that migrants’ rights must be fully protected. Regarding our latest reports (see our Scirocco of 9th march 2026) most people that were brought to Albania had lived in Italy for years but lost their jobs and, as a consequence, their residence permits. They face de facto detention, without any criminal record. A lot of people do not even get information about why they are deported to Albania. The obstruction of legal aid that Italian authorities use to avoid accountability for allegations of abuse continues with the ongoing deportations of people to Albania. Moreover, as reported by Avvenire, residents that live close to the center in Gjader reported hearing people shout inside the detention center on a regular basis, as well as many incidents about people trying to get to the hospital in order to escape from the center. Meanwhile Melonis’ party Fratelli d’italia (FdI) and the party Forza Italia are using the centers in Albania as a political strategy and instrumentalize the “less arrivals” rhetoric in order to distract from the cruelty and procedural inefficiency of the Albanian centers. Following a visit, MP Sara Kelany described the Gjader center as “operating at full capacity,” citing 82 detainees out of approximately 96 places. Similarly, Alessandro Battilocchio argued that reduced irregular arrivals show Italy is “on the right track.”
Again, the decline in arrival numbers is mentioned by members of parliament without considering rising deaths of people on the move trying to cross the Mediterranean. Additionally, several rulings by Italian courts rejecting the detention of people in the Albanian centers emphasize that the deal is far from being compatible with international law. Additionally, FdI and Forza Italia completely ignore Italy’s colonial legacy in Albania. Giorgia Meloni speaks of a “historical friendship” between Albania and Italy, overlooking the less-than-friendly history when Italy invaded Albania during the fascist regime. It’s interesting to note how Italy is leveraging former colonies to form agreements aimed at restricting migration. In order to safeguard human rights, the focus on detention measures and repatriation within migration management needs to stop. This system of containment and securitization only leads to further exclusion and health risks for people on the move and is detrimental for wider social progress.
29.04.2026: The instrumentalization of penal power: Another undemocratic security decree (Link to the PDF)
The government of Giorgia Meloni has once again introduced a new decree-law as part of the broader package of “security decrees” announced in February and March 2026 (see our previous Scirocco analyses: February 23, 2026: Fundamental rights violations pushed through a draft law). This move fits into a wider strategy that increasingly relies on criminal law as a tool to expand the powers of law enforcement authorities. Within this framework, specific groups, particularly people on the move and, more broadly, marginalized communities associated with so-called “deviance”—are implicitly constructed as threats to public order and social decorum. Decree-laws, however, are legislative instruments that the Italian Constitution reserves for “extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency.” Their repeated use in the field of migration policy further underscores the ongoing securitization of this domain.
In parallel with Italy’s promotion of “voluntary return programmes” (see our latest Scirocco on the topic), the new security decree, recently approved by the Senate, introduces a controversial provision: the Ministry of the Interior will be authorized to enter into agreements with the National Bar Council (CNF), the institutional body representing lawyers, to facilitate so-called “voluntary repatriation” schemes. The idea was to provide a financial incentive of €615 to lawyers who assist foreign nationals opting into such programmes. The Security Decree introduced by the far right seems to be part of their wider strategy on “remigration”¹ . The same amendment also targets deportations following criminal convictions, which may be imposed as an alternative penalty in certain cases. Under the new rules, the supervising judge must prioritize requests for deportation over any other petitions and issue a decision within fifteen days. At the same time, the decree introduces a deeply problematic contradiction: it effectively removes legal aid for migrants who challenge deportation orders in court, while simultaneously offering financial incentives to lawyers who encourage their clients to leave the country. Beyond reinforcing the government’s narrative of reducing migration and facilitating removals, this measure raises serious concerns about the role and independence of legal defense. Lawyers are ethically bound to act exclusively in the best interests of their clients, not to respond to financial incentives that may influence legal advice. These concerns have not gone unnoticed. The President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, has already questioned the constitutionality of the decree and signaled that he will refuse to sign it unless the provision on lawyers’ compensation is removed.
In response, Fratelli d’Italia, Meloni’s party, attempted to identify legal and procedural workarounds. The Prime Minister left the security package unchanged to prevent it from expiring and last Friday passed a separate decree with the amendments shortly after parliament gave final approval to the original text. In short, the government has stipulated that assistance with repatriation does not necessarily have to be provided by a lawyer, but may also be provided by other professionals. As a result, the bonus will not be paid solely to lawyers, but to all professionals designated to assist with voluntary repatriation procedures. Furthermore, it will be paid upon completion of the administrative procedure and no longer upon the person's actual departure. However, the separate decree has to be approved again which undermines the failure of Meloni’s continued securitization strategy and the government's tactic to overturn democratic principles.
To sum up, what emerges is a broader and more troubling pattern: penal power is no longer constrained by, nor oriented toward, the protection of fundamental rights. Instead, it is increasingly instrumentalized to advance an ideology of public order and security, one that risks criminalizing social marginality, silencing dissent, and restricting democratic freedoms. In doing so, it narrows the already limited space for collective political expression and action.
¹ The term ‘remigration’ is problematic because it has been ideologically redefined by figures associated with the New Right and is now frequently used as a euphemism for the mass deportation or expulsion of people with a migratory background.
24.4.2026: The Myth of “Voluntary” Returns (Link to the PDF)
The Italian Minister of the Interior, Piantedosi, regularly announces on his social media accounts the number of migrants and asylum seekers who have returned “voluntarily”, as in a post dated 8 April in which he celebrated the return of 174 people from Libya to their home country. Whilst these returns are portrayed as “humanitarian” and “voluntary”, they mask coercion and the violation of rights, as criticised by several civil society organisations and UN experts. So what lies behind the “voluntary” return programme?
Voluntary Assisted Return (VAR) and Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) are programmes implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and financially supported by Italy and the EU. These are aimed both at third-country nationals living in Italy and at people staying in transit countries such as Libya or Tunisia. The IOM offers support to people returning to their home countries, for example by organising transit and, in some cases, providing financial support for reintegration.
Since 2017, the Italian government has allocated around €19.5 million for the return of 11,000 people from Libya and €9 million euros from 2022 onwards for the return of 1,400 people from Tunisia. In July 2025, the Italian government approved the disbursement of a further €4 million to the IOM for the construction of 70 reception centres in Libya and €3 million for the voluntary repatriation programme. This was despite the fact that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had advised Italy in a letter against further funding of the programme and questioned its voluntary nature.
Just how little this programme is actually voluntary is particularly evident when looking at the figures for those who have returned. Around 76.5% of them were detained in Libyan detention centres prior to their return, including women, children and victims of human trafficking. Whilst voluntariness would presuppose that there are genuine alternatives, such as access to protection and regular and safe migration routes, and that the decision is made freely, in full knowledge of the facts and without any physical or psychological coercion, these conditions do not exist in Libya and other transit countries. Return is undertaken as the only way out of a hopeless situation in which people experience violence and violations of their human rights. Consequently, the RVA and VHR programmes are pressuring people to return to their home countries, where they are often once again exposed to the unsafe conditions from which they fled.
This also violates the principle of non-refoulement, i.e. the right not to be sent back to countries where one’s safety is at risk. Furthermore, by presenting the return as ‘voluntary’, bilateral agreements with the countries of origin are circumvented, and procedural guarantees and safeguards required under international law in the case of forced return are suspended. This thus also enables a faster and cheaper return under the pretext of voluntariness. By supporting ‘voluntary’ return, the migratory pressure on transit countries such as Libya and Tunisia is reduced, making their governments more willing to cooperate with Italy under other agreements or to readmit their own citizens.
Therefore, “voluntary” return programmes from transit countries should be understood far less as humanitarian programmes and instead as yet another externalisation strategy of the Italian and European border regime. To combat this strategy and the resulting human rights violations, a number of civil society organisations have joined forces to file a lawsuit and launch the “Voluntary Humanitarian Refusal” campaign. They “denounce the so-called ‘voluntary’ returns from transit countries and demand that funding for these disguised deportations be stopped”.
Similarly, the voluntary nature of the return of people living in Italy can also be called into question. For instance, people detained in Italian deportation centres (CPRs) have increasingly reported being pressured to agree to such a ‘voluntary’ return. Furthermore, there is a financial incentive of €615, which is paid in cash upon boarding the aircraft. In total, 4,059 people have returned since the programme began in Italy in 2015 up to 2024, for which the Italian government has spent €35.5 million. To increase this number of returnees, the Italian government plans a new law which provides for financial rewards not only for returnees but also for their lawyers if their clients agree to “voluntary” return to their home country. This not only further calls into question the voluntary nature of such returns, but also undermines the Italian Constitution and the integrity of legal representation. More on this new law can be read in our Scirocco.
Further problems also arise with regard to the reintegration support in the countries of origin. Such support is criticised as being highly unsustainable and deeply problematic, and further reaches only a small proportion of returnees. IOM support is often only short-term and does not adequately address the systemic causes of flight. Instead, it follows a neoliberal ‘development policy’ whereby returnees are supposed to be empowered through the promotion of entrepreneurship and market activities. However, these approaches are often standardised and take little account of the concrete realities of life, which is why many of the supported enterprises fail. Consequently, returnees often end up in even more precarious circumstances than those from which they fled. At the same time, this programme allows Italy and the EU to present themselves in a positive light, thereby concealing their neo-colonial attempt at migration control.
All these points show that ‘voluntary’ return programmes should not be described as such; rather, the term ‘soft deportation’ is far more appropriate. Their sole aim is to control migration and to present deportations as humanitarian and voluntary. Piantedosi’s regular announcement of the numbers of returnees further illustrates that these programmes serve purely to appease the right-wing electorate. Italy and the EU must no longer force people back into precarious conditions and be complicit, through such programmes, with states that systematically violate human rights and. Instead, legal and safe escape routes are needed to effectively protect vulnerable groups
17 April 2026: One Shipwreck After Another – Europe’s Complicity in Deaths in the Mediterranean
Mass death in spring 2026: in the first three months of 2026 alone, more than 700 to 800 people drowned in the Mediterranean. This means that the number of deaths has more than doubled compared with the same period last year.
In a single night at the end of March / beginning of April, 19 people died off Lampedusa, including children. The NGO Sea-Watch assumes that more than 100 people lost their lives in the Mediterranean within just three days. Another case in early April also shows how closely linked the failure to rescue and political indifference are: 44 people reached Lampedusa after being stranded for five days on the abandoned Didon oil platform (around 75 km off the Tunisian coast in the Gulf of Gabès), after falling into distress at sea following their departure from Libya. According to the survivors, their calls for help went unanswered, even though Alarm Phone had already alerted the authorities to the emergency. Sea-Watch therefore criticized the case as yet another example of rescue not being organized in time while civil assistance is structurally obstructed instead. Just a few days later, another boat capsized after departing from Libya; 32 people were rescued, while more than 70 others are presumed dead or missing. We reported on the exact figures and the background known to us in the last issue of the CMI. In this report, we provide a monthly update on developments in the central Mediterranean and put them in context. Since the issue is also currently being discussed more broadly on land, however, we are taking it up here as well and focusing in particular on the political discourse surrounding deaths in the Mediterranean.
Since the beginning of this year in particular, there has been a high number of unrecorded cases of so-called “silent deaths” or “invisible shipwrecks” — cases in which distress at sea is reported, but contact is then lost, no further information is available, and the fate of those affected remains unclear after the initial emergency call. Entire boats disappear without a trace, with no way of knowing whether any rescue measures were initiated at all. As a result, many people disappear not only physically in the Mediterranean, but also remain nameless and unidentified after their deaths. In this context, on 8 April 2026, the Sicilian public prosecutor Salvatore Vella called in the European Parliament in Brussels for better mechanisms to identify recovered bodies and missing migrants, including a shared public database and international contact points for relatives. This was discussed during the event “The Right to Identity: Towards a European Framework for Missing Migrants,” which was supported primarily by civil society actors and Members of Parliament from the progressive spectrum. That such demands still come mainly from civil society is no coincidence: to this day, the concrete work of searching, identifying, and commemorating is often carried out by relatives, initiatives, and NGOs such as Memoria Mediterranea, rather than being institutionally guaranteed in a reliable way. At the same time, the initiative took place in a highly polarized parliamentary environment: just in March, the European Parliament had adopted a significantly more restrictive return policy, supported in particular by conservative and right-wing forces. A large proportion of the dead therefore remain statistically, institutionally, and socially invisible — and are ultimately forgotten.
The extent to which this work still falls largely on civil society is also addressed in our magazine “Streiflicht Italien: Verlorene Leben, unerzählte Geschichten (Spotlight Italy: Lost Lives, Untold Stories)”: it tells of people who die while fleeing across the Mediterranean — often nameless, without farewell, and without public attention — and of the relatives who, years later, still have to fight for clarification, dignity, and remembrance. At its core are not only the consequences of failed rescue, but also the structural failure of state institutions: when bodies are buried anonymously, authorities fail to act, and human dignity is defended only through the commitment of individuals. Organizations working, among other things, on the search for and documentation of missing persons include: UNITED for Intercultural Action, the German Red Cross Tracing Service, the Italian Red Cross (CRI), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – Restoring Family Links, and Alarm Phone.
The complicity of European governments is also increasingly moving into sharper political and public focus. This responsibility does not begin only at sea: the far-reaching absence of safe and legal routes of entry is itself the result of political decisions that force people onto the life-threatening route across the central Mediterranean in the first place. The failure of states to conduct search and rescue operations, and the systematic obstruction of civil search and rescue, are therefore only the tip of the iceberg — they are part of a policy that leaves people seeking protection exposed and defenseless against the deadly dangers of the crossing. In this context, Germany has been criticized, among other things, for cutting funding for civil search and rescue in favor of military spending. Italy, too, hampers the work of civil search and rescue organizations through ordinances, decrees, and political agitation, and repeatedly sanctions NGOs — even though courts have subsequently and repeatedly ruled this practice unlawful. In addition, media reporting and independent documentation are increasingly being obstructed or rendered invisible after the fact — for example through incomplete information, the absence of transparent statistics, or restricted access to reliable data on what is happening along the Mediterranean migration routes and which actors contribute to the persistence of mass death, violence, and disappearance. Thus, the perception of these catastrophes is also shaped by a deliberate politics of information: journalists face ever greater obstacles in obtaining accurate information about rescue operations or shipwrecks, which massively hinders any independent examination of the situation. These dynamics appear particularly hypocritical at a time when the Italian government is staging its migration policy as a success story. Precisely while political “records” are being celebrated with regard to the increasingly restrictive direction of migration policy, analyses show that the number of dead and missing persons on the central Mediterranean route has by no means declined to the same extent, but instead remains dramatically high and has, in fact, risen significantly compared with the previous year.
Overall, one conclusion can once again be drawn: deaths in the Mediterranean must not be understood as fate, but must be named for what they are — a direct consequence of political decisions. This appeal must be repeated again and again, ever more loudly and with growing clarity, until it reaches all those who hold political responsibility. The fact that political and public discourse is now increasingly naming the complicity of European governments and institutions is important and necessary. At the same time, it must remain clear that far too many people had already died before this attention, and these long-overdue attributions of blame, were voiced more loudly and consciously. European governments are not only responsible now, at a moment when 2026 is considered the deadliest start to a year in many years; their complicity lies in political decisions, legal restrictions, the failure to provide search and rescue, and systematic border fortification that have long created the framework for these deaths. For precisely this reason, the narratives surrounding deaths in the Mediterranean must continue to be questioned and changed. This is the only way, the system can be challenged that is based on deterrence rather than search and rescue and the right to asylum. What is needed instead would be a structured European rescue mission, safe and legal pathways, and a fundamental departure from the fortification of “Fortress Europe”.
April 9, 2026: Meloni in Algeria and the propaganda on “less arrivals”
During her visit to Algeria at the end of March Italian prime minister Meloni declared that Italy’s partnership with Algeria “has never been so strong”. Algeria primarily serves Italy as a supplier of natural gas and it is the country's biggest trade partner on the African continent.
Meloni used the occasion to continue her propaganda on her allegedly “model of successful migration management” with non-EU-countries. According to her speech Italy’s cooperation with Algeria led to the successful combating of criminal networks involved in human trafficking as well as the reduction of “illegal landings” and tragedies at sea. This statement is not only completely false but it also reinforces the narrative of political actors that present declining arrival numbers across the Mediterranean as proof of successful policy and instrumentalize this decrease as a trophy of their populist communication. (See Scirocco of March 5, 2026: Distorted narratives of political self-legitimation: who speaks for those who never arrive?). In most cases, people leaving Algeria do not head to Italy as the main migration route from there leads to Spain or France. However, most troubling is that this reduction has not occurred because less people are in need of international protection but due to cooperation with countries like Libya, that intercepts people at sea and pulls them back, where they continue to suffer from fundamental human rights violations and enslavement. Moreover, in 2026 there has been a tremendous increase of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (as of March 21, there have been 614 confirmed deaths, with the undocumented number being way higher). So how did Italy’s “successful migration management” reduce arrival numbers by sea? By blocking NGO rescue ships with various decrees and by paying off Libyan militias. Again, it must be made clear that distorted narratives must be dismantled in order to prevent a displacement of responsibility. Less arrivals but more deaths are a direct consequence of Italy’s and the broader European migration management.
core, the accusation is that the policies of the EU and its member states between 2014 and 2025 were systematically aimed at preventing the arrival of migrants in Europe. This occurred, among other means, through cooperation with the so-called Libyan Coast Guard and the return of people to a territory (Libya) where human rights are regularly violated. According to the indictment, during this period more than 25,000 asylum seekers died while crossing the Central Mediterranean – and more than 150,000 migrants were forcibly returned to Libya, where they were subjected to detention, torture, rape, or enslavement.
The complaint by Shatz and Branco marks an important step in the political and legal confrontation with migration policy: it brings the EU’s structural migration and border policy into the focus of criminal prosecution and international legal accountability. The International Criminal Court has so far not confirmed whether it will accept or review the complaint filed in October 2025 against 122 European officials over the EU’s migration policy. Despite the uncertainty about whether investigations will ultimately be initiated or how the case will proceed, this development represents new hope for affected individuals and civil society actors: that human rights violations against migrants will no longer be regarded merely as isolated operational actions but as political processes involving fundamental questions of responsibility, decision-making, and institutional mechanisms.
