

# Sudanese in Germany

## Analysis of Protection and Integration Gaps



## **Understanding the global reaction to the displacement crises**

Sudan currently faces the world's largest displacement crisis, with millions displaced internally and more than 4.4 million people having fled to neighbouring countries including Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda and the Central African Republic. Yet only a small proportion of displaced Sudanese reach Europe, with Germany receiving approximately 50–100 asylum applications per month. Despite the existence of an established Sudanese community in Germany, Sudanese diaspora networks often lack the capacity to provide newly arrived individuals with the support required for integration and protection and Sudanese already settled in Germany remain heavily burdened by the need to support their displaced family members .

Germany occupies a significant position in responding to the consequences of the Sudan crisis. Beyond its international protection obligations, it has increasingly positioned itself as a central diplomatic and humanitarian actor since the outbreak of war in 2023. Through humanitarian assistance, diplomatic engagement, and co-hosting major international conferences, Germany has contributed to shaping international responses to the conflict while simultaneously confronting challenges related to migration governance, protection responsibilities, and regional stabilization.

These dynamics create an important context for understanding the situation of Sudanese communities in the country. While the Sudan crisis remains first and foremost a humanitarian emergency, it also raises questions regarding access to protection, integration capacities, and the adequacy of existing policy frameworks. Against this backdrop, this paper examines contemporary displacement patterns, protection gaps, and the policy adjustments necessary to strengthen access to safety and support for Sudanese individuals both within Germany and across the European Union. The paper's approach combines output data from a desk review of secondary sources - which includes institutional websites - and of testimonies collected through targeted interviews with Sudanese migrants and refugees in Berlin and Lower Saxony.

If the goal of this reference paper is to "make Sudanese realities visible," then the next step is clear: building recommendations and projects that amplify Sudanese voices, strengthen community structures, and connect the diaspora to Germany's political landscape – while imagining a future role for Sudanese expertise in rebuilding Sudan.

## Understanding the conflict dynamics

The displacement crisis in Sudan is the direct outcome of the large-scale armed conflict that erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). What began as urban combat in Khartoum quickly expanded into a nationwide war, engulfing Darfur, Kordofan and other regions. The conflict has been characterised by intense urban warfare, systematic attacks on civilian infrastructure, ethnically targeted violence against non-Arab communities, and the collapse of basic governance and essential services. These conditions have made civilian life untenable, turning displacement from a side-effect of the conflict into a structural and predictable outcome. Three years on, the scale and speed of displacement reflect the severity of the violence: according to the United Nations, Sudan now faces the world's largest displacement crisis globally, with millions uprooted inside the country and more than 4.4 million people having fled across borders to Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda and the Central African Republic.

Most people first flee to Egypt, where nearly half a million Sudanese have arrived but encounter the absence of a functioning asylum system, shrinking residency options, rising racism, and deepening legal and economic precarity. For many, the only possible onward route becomes the journey westward toward Libya- a context defined by militia rule, arbitrary detention, torture, extortion, and the systematic “selling” of Sudanese migrants into forced labour networks. Libya represents the most violent stage of the escape route, where EU-funded coast guards intercept boats and return people to detention centres, effectively closing off even the possibility of sea rescue. Those who manage to leave Libya often attempt secondary routes through Tunisia, where expulsions to the desert, racialised violence, and the absence of protection have intensified since 2023. Others move further west toward Morocco, hoping to reach Spain via the Canary Islands or the fences of Melilla and Ceuta. These western routes are equally deadly, marked by long desert crossings, being forced to rely on smuggling networks, and repeated pushbacks by Moroccan and European authorities. Across all these pathways, Sudanese refugees face a continuum of violence, state repression, militia control of transport, racial profiling, and EU externalisation policies that block legal entry and force people into increasingly dangerous journeys.

English summary (3 lines):

Human Rights Watch reports that Egypt has arbitrarily detained and deported Sudanese refugees due to expired residence permits caused by bureaucratic delays. The new 2024 asylum law lacks key protections, including the ban on forced return. The organization urges Egypt to halt deportations and amend the law to safeguard refugees' rights.

## Deadly mediterranean crossings: the sombouk Route

The sea journey (“sombouk”) from Libya and Tunisia toward Greece and Italy has become one of the deadliest escape routes for Sudanese refugees. Departures from Tobruk in eastern Libya increased sharply between 2024 and 2026 due to the reconfiguration of displacement routes, forming what Frontex now identifies as a new migratory corridor toward Crete and southern Italy. In March 2026, one of the most shocking incidents occurred when a boat drifting for six days after leaving Tobruk saw 22 Sudanese passengers thrown overboard on the orders of smugglers after food and water ran out; survivors were later rescued south of Crete. The central Mediterranean has also witnessed catastrophic shipwrecks involving Sudanese refugees: in September 2025, two major disasters off Tobruk left at least 110 people dead or missing, including a vessel carrying 74 people - mostly Sudanese - that capsized with only 13 survivors, and another boat carrying 75 Sudanese that caught fire, causing the death of at least 50 people.

These tragedies reflect a broader pattern of pushbacks, delayed rescue operations, and systematic non-assistance at sea. EU-supported Libyan coast guards continue to intercept boats and return people to detention centres, while Greek and Italian authorities face repeated accusations of failing to respond to distress calls

In general, across the Mediterranean, the scale of loss is staggering. In 2025 alone, in total 2,452 migrants and refugees died or went missing, making the central Mediterranean the world’s deadliest migration route. Sudanese refugees are disproportionately represented in these numbers due to the collapse of safe pathways and the intensification of violence in Libya. For many who eventually reach the EU and Germany, these crossings are not merely a stage in their migration - they are a defining trauma that shapes their legal, psychological, and social needs long after arrival

” A multi-country chain of trauma shaped by war, border militarisation, and the absence of safe pathways ”

## The Jango: shift in Jango Identity

Within this landscape, the term Jango has evolved from describing seasonal migrant laborers to symbolizing collective forced migration. Influenced by social media platforms like TikTok and Facebook, the Jango have begun identifying themselves as part of the “Sombouk migration,” reflecting a shift from labor mobility to a struggle for survival and rights — a transformation that reshapes their identity and lived experience.

## **European externalisation policies**

European externalisation policies shaped Sudanese mobility through a system of delegated border control that empowered Sudan's security institutions long before refugees reached Europe. Over the past decade, the European Union expanded partnerships with Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, channeling migration-management funds through Sudanese state bodies in an environment where security agencies and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) operated as a single coercive structure. Investigations by DW (2019), The New Humanitarian (2019), and The Guardian (2018) show that EU financing delivered under frameworks such as the Khartoum Process and the Better Migration Management initiative moved through institutions with direct operational links to RSF.

This created conditions in which European support for border surveillance, interception capacity, and migration control strengthened RSF influence, expanded its logistical reach, and reinforced its position as a dominant armed actor inside Sudan.

Sudanese journalist Khalid Al-Ayaser—currently serving as Minister of Information in Sudan's transitional Government of Hope—offered an early and precise analysis of this dynamic in his 2017 [article on the Khartoum Process](#). His article demonstrated that Europe's shift toward security cooperation with Sudan emerged from internal European pressures over irregular migration and political anxieties, especially within Germany. He explained that the Khartoum Process functioned as a strategic bargain: European leaders sought containment of migration flows, while Sudan leveraged its geographic position and security apparatus to regain international legitimacy and secure substantial financial resources.

This bargain elevated RSF from a militia with a record of grave abuses to a central partner in regional border control, reshaping power balances inside Sudan and embedding structural risk into the mobility trajectories of Sudanese refugees

Through this governance architecture, Europe delegated border enforcement to actors with limited accountability, prioritized deterrence over protection, and contributed to the rise of a security landscape that produced violence, detention, and forced displacement

## **EU and Germany's role in the displacement of Sudanese**

Although most Sudanese displacement remains within the region, EU externalization frameworks have influenced mobility options and the broader policy environment in which Germany operates. These dynamics mean that Sudanese refugees are overwhelmingly contained in neighboring states, where overstretched systems and chronic underfunding severely limit access to protection, documentation, and durable solutions. Only a very small proportion—well under one percent—reach Europe, reflecting both structural barriers to mobility and the restrictive architecture governing access to asylum pathways. Within this

context, Germany's role becomes particularly significant. While the Sudan crisis is first and foremost a humanitarian emergency, it also intersects directly with Germany's long-standing foreign policy and migration governance priorities, including protection responsibilities, regional stabilization, and the management of onward movement. Germany has historically engaged in the Horn of Africa through multilateral peacekeeping, stabilization missions, and development cooperation, and since the outbreak of the war in 2023 it has assumed an increasingly visible diplomatic and humanitarian role. Through its co-hosting of major international conferences in Paris (2024), London (2025), and Berlin (2026), Germany has positioned itself as one of the central actors in mobilizing aid, advocating for civilian protection, and shaping international responses to the crisis.

At the European level, Sudan has also occupied an important position within external migration governance initiatives, particularly through the Khartoum Process, which institutionalised cooperation between the European Union and states in the Horn of Africa. Through dialogue and capacity building, it has generated sustained debate regarding its implications for states on migration management.

While the process was initially framed as a platform for mobility, accountability, and protection - particularly in light of the current displacement crisis. To this extent, Germany plays a major role in implementing the Khartoum Process via the development agency GIZ in the content of the Better Migration Management (BMM) project<sup>1</sup>.

The current displacement crisis therefore raises not only humanitarian and protection concerns, but also broader questions regarding Germany's responsibilities and policy coherence in relation to international protection.

### **Sudanese refugees in Germany: Insights from available public data**

According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Germany received in total - considering all nationalities- 351,915 asylum applications in 2023, followed by a marked decline to 229,751 first-time applications in 2024. This decline continued into 2025 at the European level, where asylum applications in EU+ countries dropped by 23% in the first half of 2025 compared to the previous year due to the deterring policies implemented at both national and international levels.

In Germany, the number of newly arrived Sudanese seeking protection remains comparatively small, consistent with the broader pattern of restricted mobility to Europe and the overall decline in asylum applications. Existing population figures - such as the approximately 20,000 people of Sudanese origin recorded in the Ausländerzentralregister - reflect long-standing communities rather than displacement linked to the post-2023 conflict. This distinction is important, as Germany's engagement with the Sudan crisis is shaped less by large-scale arrivals and more by its diplomatic, humanitarian, and policy roles within the wider EU protection landscape.

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<sup>1</sup> The BMM coordinated by the German development agency GIZ. Jointly executed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNODC, Expertise France, CIVIPOL, Italian State Police, and the British.

In particular, according to [Ausländerzentralregister](#)-based estimates (reported in German migration statistics), around 20,000 people of Sudanese origin live in Germany, including about 12,300 Sudanese citizens, with roughly 9,000 residing in Lower Saxony.

### **Beyond legal categories: protection and integration gaps**

By the time Sudanese refugees reach Germany, they have survived a multi-country chain of trauma shaped by war, border militarisation, and the absence of safe pathways. Yet arrival does not mark the end of instability. Germany receives only 50–100 Sudanese asylum requests per month, and most applicants are granted short-term humanitarian permits in the form of subsidiary protection that do not reflect the protracted nature of Sudan's conflict. Family reunification remains largely suspended, access to study and work pathways is limited, and many are placed in remote camps with reduced integration support. At the same time, the Sudanese community in Germany carries the emotional and financial burden of supporting families trapped in Egypt, Libya, Chad, and Sudan. Understanding these escape routes - and the political forces shaping them - is essential for assessing the protection gaps Sudanese refugees face in Germany and for designing policies that respond to their lived realities rather than the narrow lens of arrival statistics.

#### *Data on Sudanese asylum seekers in Germany*

Within this broader context, Sudanese asylum seekers represent a relatively small but increasingly significant group. Global data from UNHCR indicate large-scale and rising displacement linked to the Sudan war, genocide, dire humanitarian conditions, and deep reliance on humanitarian aid, reaching millions of displaced ([both internally and externally](#)) [in recent years](#).

Significantly, cross-border displacement has reached unprecedented levels. By 16 March 2026, [over 4.4 million](#) people had fled Sudan to neighbouring countries, including Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. These movements remain overwhelmingly regional, placing significant strain on already fragile host countries and limiting access to sustainable protection solutions. A tiny fraction reaches Europe, with less than 1% of Sudan's displaced population. Since April 2023, 13,435 [Sudanese](#) have found refuge in the EU with Germany receiving [50–100](#) Sudanese asylum requests per month.

Although Sudanese nationals do not rank among the top countries of origin in Germany, BAMF data and EU-level statistics show a clear pattern of steady, low-volume inflows combined with high protection outcomes. According to the BAMF, asylum statistics are published monthly and include nationality-specific breakdowns [of applications](#) and decisions, confirming that Sudanese applicants are consistently present but numerically limited compared to [major groups](#) such as Syrians or Afghans. More specifically, Sudanese nationals do not appear among the top ten nationalities in 2025. [This implies](#) that Sudanese applicants make up a tiny fraction of total applications combined with all other smaller nationalities, [placing](#) them in a [statistically](#) minor but stable category. The German Federal office shows that a total of 778 Sudanese nationals applied for asylum in 2025, with [1,437](#)

decisions made on asylum applications. In comparison to the overall 168,543 asylum applications recorded in Germany in the same year, Sudanese applicants accounted for approximately 0.4% of total cases. This confirms that Sudanese nationals do not belong to the major countries of origin in Germany and do not appear among the top ten nationalities. Nevertheless, their consistent presence in asylum statistics, combined with high recognition rates (Asylberechtigte, Flüchtlinge, Subsidiary Protection: 66% of recognition of which 54.4% of subsidiary protection alone, places them among smaller but analytically significant groups within the German asylum system. According to the data provided by BAMF, as of March 2026, the number of Sudanese nationals applying for asylum in Germany still does not rank in the top ten countries. Indeed, asylum requests from Sudanese are 185 in the first quarter of 2026. Nonetheless, recognition rates reflect the trend of 2025 and they regard different types of protection statuses granted to Sudanese protection seekers. In the first months of 2026 the decisions taken on asylum requests regarded the grant of three different legal statuses: Asylum Entitlement, Refugee Status (16%), and Subsidiary Protection (42%).

### *Protection statuses in Germany*

Asylum Entitlement (“Asylberechtigte”) was granted to about 3% of asylum requests under Article 16a of the GG (Grundgesetz, German Constitution). This status pertains to people persecuted by their own states on the basis of specific conditions (nationality, religion, political opinion). This kind of protection entails benefits in line with those derived by the Refugee Status attributed under the 1951 Geneva Convention. While Asylum Entitlement follows a strict definition, under the Convention a well-founded fear of persecution should be established, with persecution coming from either state or non-state actors. Nonetheless, the bulk of Sudanese asylum seekers are granted Subsidiary Protection (42%). Shortly, the latter has legal basis in the EU Qualification Directive (since June 2026, in the Qualification Regulation). It is intended to protect people who do not meet refugee criteria, but would face serious harm if returned, such as the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and serious threat due to war or conflict. For Sudanese who requested asylum after April 2023, this status has been applied on the basis that there is an ongoing conflict in the country which creates “temporary” grounds for displacement. To this extent, Subsidiary Protection provides more limited benefits in line with its neglect of wars’ long-lasting impacts. In particular, the residence permit must be renewed after one year, for some cases with permanent residency being possible after 5 years, but subject to stricter permission compared to Refugee Status or Asylum Entitlements. In addition, while family reunification is permitted under the previous two, with subsidiary protection it is usually restricted or delayed. However, starting from 2025 the German government agreed on the suspension of family reunification for those holding a Subsidiary Protection Status until at least July 2027. Similarly, employment, social, and integration services are not easily accessible, despite the strong skills coming with Sudanese migrants.

## EU dimension

### *The Dublin System: Structural Barriers for Sudanese Applicants*

The Dublin Regulation assigns responsibility for asylum claims to the first EU country of entry, a system that seriously affects Sudanese refugees because most arrive through Greece after dangerous journeys across the central Mediterranean from Libya. For Sudanese applicants, Dublin procedures mean the constant threat of being transferred back to countries where protection standards are significantly lower, legal aid is limited, and people are already traumatised.

“Many Sudanese who reach Germany have already experienced detention, prosecution, or pushbacks in Greece, yet the Dublin framework continues to treat Greece as a “safe” country of return.”

This creates a protection gap: Germany recognizes the severity of the Sudan conflict but still applies a system that ignores the long chain of violence refugees endure before arrival.

### *Greece as a Case Study: Criminalization and Lower Protection Standards*

Greece illustrates the sharpest edge of EU migration policy. Sudanese refugees arriving from Libya face immediate criminalization: hundreds have been prosecuted as “smugglers” simply for steering a boat under threat, with trials lasting minutes and sentences reaching 10–25 years. *According to Matarris Initiative* over 328 Sudanese—some as young as 15—are currently imprisoned under these laws. Protection standards remain significantly lower than in Germany. Legal procedures are characterized by limited interpretation, inadequate asylum information, and overcrowded camps. Many Sudanese leave Greece because survival there is nearly impossible.

Insights from the Matarris Initiative in Greece, which works directly with Sudanese detainees and asylum seekers, provide critical evidence of the risks Sudanese refugees face before reaching Germany. Members of the initiative reported that Sudanese arrivals from Libya are routinely criminalized, with trials lasting minutes and resulting in sentences of 10–25 years. According to Matarris, “more than three hundred Sudanese men in Greece prison. many of them minors or young adults who were arrested simply for steering a boat under threat. The initiative also documented cases where detainees had no access to interpreters, legal information, or contact with their families. These testimonies illustrate how Greece functions as a bottleneck of criminalization within the EU asylum system, producing long-term legal and psychological consequences that refugees carry with them into Germany.

The Sudanese case exposes the structural weaknesses of the EU asylum system, we can be summarised as follows:

- externalization instead of protection
- criminalization instead of safe pathways
- temporary permits instead of long-term solutions isolation instead of integration
- political neglect instead of meaningful participation

The system “looks protective on paper” but fails in practice, as described by multiple respondents:

- Housing placement in remote areas contributes to isolation and weak integration outcomes;
- Criminalization in Greece creates long-term legal and psychological harm; lack of information due to language barriers forces refugees to rely on informal networks rather than official channels.

## **Between safety, integration, and exclusion**

### *Short-Term Humanitarian Permits Without Long-Term Vision*

After the outbreak of the war, Germany mostly granted Sudanese one-year residence permits in the form of subsidiary protection. These permits are annually extended based on Germany’s assessment of the situation. Still, they do not acknowledge the long-term impacts of the conflict or the trauma accumulated along the escape route. The temporary nature of these permits creates insecurity, prevents long-term planning, and limits access to education, employment, and integration programs. This precarious situation adds up to pre-existing trauma and creates a sense of exhaustion and profound instability in those affected who face equal difficulty to access family reunification.

### *Housing, isolation, and barriers to integration*

Sudanese refugees are often placed in remote camps far from cities - such as those outside Hannover - making integration extremely difficult. Even if the camps are inside the city, as it is the case of Amira who lives within the city of Berlin, they are not adequate for people with specific needs. She has indeed gone through a surgery which makes mobility very difficult for her. However, she has not been equipped with adequate movement auxiliaries or specific tools. This situation creates obstacles to her recovery but it also limits her possibility to socialize. In addition, she does not have access to the kitchen and thus cannot cook for herself according to her personal needs and taste. She feels like being “in prison”.

According to Sara, what troubles Sudanese most is the question how to meet the challenges and create networks with their community.

### *The Impact of random Refugee placement on Sudanese integration*

Interviews with Sudanese refugees in Germany show that the random dispersal of newcomers into remote areas is a major barrier to integration. Many respondents described being placed far from transport, services, and-most importantly-from the established Sudanese community that could support them. As one participant noted, "being housed so far away made integration much harder for us." This enforced distance weakens social networks, isolates new arrivals, and turns legal protection into practical exclusion.

Moreover, any of the women interviewed were highly educated, multilingual, and possessed significant professional and leadership experience. Several had backgrounds in fields such as engineering, architecture, and political advocacy, and had previously engaged in international initiatives related to women's rights and humanitarian issues. Despite these qualifications, many encountered considerable precarity and uncertainty after arriving in Germany. One interviewee, a political activist and computer engineer, described being trapped in prolonged legal and social limbo after appealing the rejection of her asylum application. Since late 2025, she had been confined to temporary accommodation while awaiting a response to her appeal. Although she continued to participate remotely in international conferences, health-related limitations prevented her from engaging with the Sudanese community in Berlin. She emphasized feelings of exhaustion, social isolation, and emotional distress.

### *Challenges related to access education in Germany*

*Another participant, who had initially arrived on a volunteer visa and was later seeking a student visa, recounted the difficulties of continuing her education in Germany. Having previously studied architecture in Khartoum, she faced substantial bureaucratic obstacles concerning the recognition of her academic credentials and examinations, forcing her to consider restarting her degree program entirely. She also highlighted the unequal access to mobility pathways, noting that her family had been able to leave Sudan shortly after the outbreak of war, whereas later applicants encountered far greater restrictions and barriers to obtaining visas. Furthermore, she stressed the importance of rebuilding social ties within the Sudanese diaspora community, particularly as a means of collectively processing shared experiences of war and displacement.*

## *The Breakdown of Family Reunification for Sudanese Refugees*

Germany's visa system for Sudanese nationals has become nearly inaccessible. With the embassy in Khartoum closed and visa processing moved abroad, families face long waits, unsafe travel, and almost. At the same time, Germany has not created any humanitarian admission or alternative pathway for Sudanese refugees, leaving people with no safe or realistic route to protection.

For those already in Germany, the situation is even more severe. **Family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection has been effectively suspended**, leaving spouses and children trapped in conflict zones or stranded in third countries. Refugees repeatedly stressed that the current requirements are impossible to meet under conditions of war - documents cannot be obtained, embassies cannot be reached, and the system offers no flexibility.

As a result, families remain separated for years, pushing people toward dangerous journeys and deepening emotional distress. The absence of legal pathways turns protection into prolonged uncertainty, leaving Sudanese refugees in Germany unable to reunite with their families or rebuild their lives.

### *Lack of Institutional Support and Weak Sudanese Lobbying Power*

Unlike other diasporas, the Sudanese community in Germany has limited political influence and minimal engagement with the Bundestag on African migration issues. Internal political divisions – reflecting the polarization inside Sudan – further weaken collective advocacy. Meanwhile, organizations like Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung and migrant-led groups highlight the gaps but lack the scale to shift national policy.

### *Why These Gaps Matter: A Human and Political Reality*

Sudanese refugees in Germany live with the emotional burden of supporting families trapped in war zones, displacement camps, or unsafe transit countries. Street kitchens in Sudan rely predominantly on diaspora remittances. Children in German schools see Ukraine and Gaza discussed extensively, while the war destroying their own country remains invisible. This invisibility deepens the sense of marginalization.

At the same time, far-right narratives have gained political power across Europe, shaping public opinion and policy. The shift from Merkel's "Wir schaffen das" to restrictive asylum reforms reflects a broader climate where refugee rights are increasingly undermined. Sudanese refugees, despite being a small population, are affected by this political environment.

## **Recommendations:**

Refugee councils and competent institutions in Germany must break this chain of trauma and isolation by offering protection, visibility, and meaningful integration. must move beyond treating Sudanese community initiatives as informal volunteer networks filling gaps left by public institutions and instead recognize them as essential actors in protection, integration, and social cohesion. This requires establishing targeted support mechanisms that enable Sudanese-led organizations to build sustainable community infrastructure and access long-term funding opportunities. Strong community structures reduce isolation, improve access to services, strengthen trust in institutions, and create pathways for meaningful participation.

The Sudanese community in Germany needs:

- Recognition of civil society initiatives like Salaam Sudan and Sudan Uprising as significant actors in finding peaceful solutions for the conflict in Sudan and the political transition beyond political representatives of the political parties and governments.
- Relocation programs for refugees stranded in Libya and Tunisia
- Provision of Visa for family reunification
- Capacity-building and organizational development support enabling the Sudanese community to formalize structures, strengthen governance, apply for funding, and build sustainable institutions;
- Dedicated funding streams for community-led services, including legal advice, psychosocial and health counselling, orientation services, peer-support networks, and protection initiatives;
- Investment in language and integration programs delivered through trusted community structures, including German classes, and information sessions on rights and services;
- Training and technical assistance on fundraising, project management, financial administration, advocacy, and partnership-building to enable Sudanese organizations to engage equally with institutions and funding mechanisms.