
Timeline September, October, November, December 2025
Palermo

borderline-europe, Sizilien

SCIROCCO

News from Italy



Scirocco [ʃiˈrɔkko-**Schirokko**] is a hot, strong south-easterly wind that carries dust and sand across the Mediterranean to Sicily and northern Italy, often lasting only for just a few hours. This News Flash has been regularly published since March 2021 and is now issued as a timeline on our website since June 2025.

Italy's migration policy

September, 11 2025

New Legal Limits for Italy's Repressive Migration Policy

There have been new developments concerning preventive detention in Italy's deportation centers (CPR). In March, the Meloni government introduced a law that, among other things, allowed local police headquarters (Questure) to keep people in custody for up to 48 additional hours – even when a court had not confirmed their detention. In principle, people in such cases should be released immediately. However, under the new rule, they could remain imprisoned for 48 hours while the police assessed whether they posed a “danger to the public.” This provision also applied to the newly established centers in Albania and was closely tied to the agreement between Rome and Tirana.

The starting point for judicial review of this provision was the case of [Mohammed Ndaje](#), a 32-year-old Senegalese citizen. An expulsion order against him had already been in place since 2016, and his asylum applications had been repeatedly rejected due to several criminal convictions. In early 2024, he was transferred from the CPR in Bari to the new deportation center in Gjader (Albania), opened under the Rome-Tirana agreement. After a court did not confirm his detention, he was returned to Bari, where he was nonetheless held in preventive custody from 4 to 5 July. For the judges of the Court of Cassation (equivalent to the Supreme Court in Germany), this represented an “evident interference with the fundamental right to personal liberty.”

Particularly problematic was the lack of clarity in interpreting what constituted a “threat to public safety and order.” According to this rule, prior convictions or the mere absence of documents could be sufficient to justify prolonged detention on the basis of a police assessment alone – without judicial oversight. The Court of Cassation has now

declared this [practice unlawful](#). Even for people with rejected asylum claims or criminal records, preventive detention is not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The [48-hour rule has thus been suspended](#) for the time being, though the final word rests with the Constitutional Court.

For those affected, this means they can still be subjected to accelerated procedures and placed in closed deportation centers. However, without a judicial decision, they can no longer be held preventively for any additional hours. Despite this positive judicial ruling in favor of migrants, the structural problems of deportation detention remain: the deadlines for appeals against asylum decisions leave refugees with hardly any realistic chance of obtaining legal support. This ruling makes clear that the courts are prepared to remind the government of constitutional standards and to hold it accountable – and that Italy's migration policy is increasingly being decided not only at the borders but also in the courtrooms.

September, 19 2025

Mediterranea Calls for Justice: Submits Evidence of Libyan Human Rights Violations at Sea and Italian Complicity to the Courts

The Italian NGO *Mediterranea Saving Humans* has [requested](#) the public prosecutor's office in Trapani to initiate criminal investigations after Libyan soldiers threw ten people—including several minors—overboard with brutal physical violence in international waters on August 21. The crew of *Mediterranea* witnessed this brutal incident firsthand and has requested to testify as witnesses in the event of a possible trial. Only the immediate presence of the ship and the rapid intervention of the rescue team [prevented the people from drowning](#). A more detailed description of the dangerous situation at sea and the criminalization by the Italian authorities following the rescue can be found in the [latest issue](#) of our Central Mediterranean Info (English version will follow soon).

The investigation by *Mediterranea*, based on video and photo footage from a journalist with *La*

Repubblica who accompanied the NGO's new ship on its first mission, provides [clear evidence](#) of Italian complicity in Libyan human rights violations: The soldiers who also pursued and threatened the *Mediterranea* crew for hours at sea on August 18 are part of the 80th Battalion of the Special Forces of the 111th Brigade, which is led by Abdul Salam Al-Zoubi, the Deputy Defense Minister of the Libyan Government of National Unity in Tripoli. This brigade is known for arrests and the transfer of people to Libyan torture camps. On September 4, just days after the attack by the soldiers, there was a meeting between Al-Zoubi and Italy's Interior Minister Piantedosi, Police Chief Vittorio Pisani, and Intelligence Director Giovanni Caravelli, during which the "strategic partnership" between Italy and Libya was once again reaffirmed.

The NGO has also [submitted](#) its comprehensive investigation, which led to the identification of the Libyan soldiers, to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has incorporated the documentation into the ongoing proceedings on human rights violations in Libya. As part of this case, there is also an international arrest warrant for El-Masri, which the Italian government actively ignored in January 2025, instead allowing the internationally wanted war criminal to depart on an Italian government flight.

If the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya is not terminated by November 2, 2025, it will be automatically extended for another three years.

We support the [campaign "Stop the Memorandum Italy-Libya"](#), led by *Refugees in Libya*, and call for an end to Italian complicity.

European migration policy

Oktober, 07 2025

More surveillance, less protection: How the EU further criminalizes migration with new Europol powers

On September 25, 2025, [the Council of the EU and the European Parliament](#) reached a provisional agreement to strengthen Europol in the area of combating "smuggling crime and human

trafficking." The changes to Europol's mandate provide for ensuring closer cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and the EU police agency. A central component of the package is the establishment of a European Centre against Migrant Smuggling as a permanent structure within Europol. In addition, Frontex and Eurojust are to send liaison officers to the centre. For implementation, the EU is providing an additional 50 million euros and 50 new positions at Europol.

While the European Commission welcomes the agreement as an "important step," civil society organizations sharply criticize the expansion of Europol's powers. Already in the spring, more than [40 NGOs warned in an open letter](#) that the reform exacerbates the criminalization of migration and represents an inadmissible expansion of competences. [The left-wing MEP Ilaria Salis](#) (Sinistra Italiana) also criticized that Frontex and Europol are "central to a European system that equates migration wholesale with criminality". What is being sold as a fight against "criminal networks" in practice means a further shift in discourse: people seeking protection are increasingly treated as a security problem — not as people in need — through intensified data collection, biometric surveillance, and police work. Meanwhile, the central cause remains untouched: since the EU continues to block legal routes for escape and migration, an estimated [90%](#) of all migrants are forced to rely on smuggling networks.

Oktober, 23 2025

Borders Cost Lives – Europe's Responsibility Before the International Criminal Court

On October 16, 2025, human rights lawyers [Omer Shatz](#) and [Juan Branco](#) filed a comprehensive complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC), accusing 122 leading European decision-makers – including heads of state and government as well as ministers from European countries – of alleged crimes against humanity in connection with the EU's migration and border policies along the Central Mediterranean route. Their submission consists of more than 700 pages and is based on six years of investigation, including interviews with 77

senior EU officials, confidential records of meetings of the Council of the EU, and a database containing over 500 individuals, 122 of whom are named as suspects.

At its core, the accusation is that the policies of the EU and its member states between 2014 and 2025 were systematically aimed at preventing the arrival of migrants in Europe. This occurred, among other means, through cooperation with the so-called Libyan Coast Guard and the return of people to a territory (Libya) where human rights are regularly violated. According to the indictment, during this period more than 25,000 asylum seekers died while crossing the Central Mediterranean – and more than 150,000 migrants were forcibly returned to Libya, where they were subjected to detention, torture, rape, or enslavement.

The complaint by Shatz and Branco marks an important step in the political and legal confrontation with migration policy: it brings the EU's structural migration and border policy into the focus of criminal prosecution and international legal accountability. The International Criminal Court has so far not confirmed whether it will accept or review the complaint filed in October 2025 against 122 European officials over the EU's migration policy. Despite the uncertainty about whether investigations will ultimately be initiated or how the case will proceed, this development represents new hope for affected individuals and civil society actors: that human rights violations against migrants will no longer be regarded merely as isolated operational actions but as political processes involving fundamental questions of responsibility, decision-making, and institutional mechanisms.

Oktober, 30 2025

The “Pact for the Mediterranean” – How the EU Repackages Its Mediterranean Policy

On October 16, 2025, the European Commission presented the “Pact for the Mediterranean” a new framework aimed at redefining the EU's relations with ten states in the southern Mediterranean region, including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. According to Brussels, the goal is to create a

common Mediterranean space based on mutual benefit, shared responsibility, and economic integration. The pact includes projects in areas such as trade, energy, digitalization, education, climate, and migration.

Civil society organizations and think tanks have voiced criticism of the pact's approach and priorities. According to EuroMed Rights, the consultation process was limited, as many people and communities who experienced repression in various regions were not heard. The focus on investment and trade without reference to democratic reforms repeats the mistakes of previous EU neighborhood policies. The Carnegie Endowment think tank described the pact as “dead on arrival” – a project that reinforces existing power structures and primarily secures European security and economic interests. The expansion of the Erasmus+ program to southern Mediterranean countries appears to be a symbolic attempt to strengthen cooperation through education, yet remains embedded in a broader logic dominated by security and economic considerations.

In short: the Pact for the Mediterranean promises cooperation but at its core, it continues the externalization of European migration policy: control, deterrence, and the delegation of responsibility to authoritarian regimes instead of protection and rights for people on the move.

November, 06 2025

Frontex tests new screening procedure on Lampedusa

A new biometric screening procedure for migrants was tested on Lampedusa as part of the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum (CEAS reform). Between 13 and 24 October, Frontex, Europol, the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA), and Italian authorities participated in the pilot phase. Biometric data from a total of 240 individuals were collected and shared with EU-wide databases such as SIS, VIS, EES, and ETIAS. The screening procedure is set to become mandatory from June 2026 for all third-country nationals without valid entry permits. In addition to the introduction of facial recognition,

the minimum age for fingerprint collection will be lowered from fourteen to six years.

According to the EUAA, the regulation is a key element of a new, "more effective" migration management system intended to enhance cooperation between EU agencies and Member States. [Critics](#), however, warn that the expansion of biometric data collection, especially involving minors, is a new level of migration surveillance. [Amnesty International](#) has long cautioned that those practices at borders often take place without informed consent, thereby violating fundamental rights of people seeking protection.

Once again, Italy serves as a [testing ground](#) for Europe's policy of deterrence and exclusion. We join this criticism and reject the normalization of digital surveillance and the disregard for the fundamental rights of people on the move. We call not only for greater transparency, but for an EU policy firmly grounded in human rights, protection, and solidarity.

Dezember, 09 2025

Meloni builds coalition to challenge the European Convention of Human Rights

The Italian government repeatedly pushes for a reform of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to ease deportations. Therefore Giorgia Meloni gathers allies in the EU and the Council of Europe. Their pressure led to an upcoming [meeting of the Council of Europe](#) to discuss issues related to migration and the ECHR on December 10th, the 77th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The [ECHR](#) is legally binding to all members of the Council of Europe and is interpreted and protected by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

[Since December 2024](#), Meloni, the Danish and Dutch Prime Ministers Mette Frederiksen and Dick Schoof, in cooperation with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, have frequently hosted informal meetings to discuss „[innovative solutions for the management of migration](#)“. The initial meeting was joined by the heads of

government from Cyprus, Greece, Malta, the Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, and Hungary. It focused on new legal frameworks for easier deportations, a less strict definition of safe countries and the possible creation of 'return hubs' in third countries based on the model of the Italy-Albania Protocol.

Then, in May 2025, led by Meloni and Frederiksen, nine EU member states called in an open letter for "[a new and open minded conversation about the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights](#)". They claimed that the interpretation by the ECtHR of the ECHR goes too far and limits their ability to manage the deportation and surveillance of foreign nationals with criminal records. Furthermore, they contended that the conventions were created in a different historical era and therefore would no longer meet today's migration challenges.

After the letter was published, the heads of government of Germany, Austria and Belgium have also joined those meetings behind closed doors. While the press releases remain vague on details, the Italian government has emphasized its commitment and efforts to adjust the interpretation of "[international conventions to address the challenges of irregular migration](#)" in every meeting.

It appears that the pressure from Italy and its allies has successfully influenced Alain Berset, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, to convene the informal Ministerial Conference on December 10th. [Berset reiterated](#) in his response to the open letter that the independence of the ECtHR is the foundation of the Council of Europe and that it should not be politicized. [While he still](#) emphasizes that the ECHR must not be weakened, he has now opened an official debate inside the Council over the interpretation and implementation of human rights regarding migrants. [A preparatory meeting](#) for December 10th, to which Meloni invited delegates on November 5th in Rome, was attended by representatives from 27 Council of Europe member states.

Meloni even took her agenda to a global level and advocated for it in the UN General Assembly. She called for a profound revision of international conventions and claimed that the conventions on migration and asylum "[were established at a time](#)

when mass irregular migration did not exist and nor did human traffickers. These conventions are no longer current in this context and, when they are interpreted in an ideological and unidirectional way by politicised judges, they end up trampling on the law, rather than upholding it". The Italian Prime Minister manages to take her long-standing national fight against the judiciary to a new level, attacking the universality of human rights and politicizing international courts. The broad European support is alarming. A "reinterpretation" of the convention to ease deportations means a weakening of human rights in Europe. This can set a dangerous precedent and pave the way to further weaken human rights for asylum seekers and everybody in Europe.

Dezember, 23 2025

Safe Third Countries and Safe Countries of Origin: What This Means for the EU and Italy

On 18 December 2025, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament reached two provisional agreements in the field of European asylum law: one on new rules regarding so-called [safe third countries](#) and another on the introduction of a [common EU list of safe countries of origin](#). Both the revision of the [safe third country](#) concept and the establishment of an [EU-wide list of safe countries of origin](#) are part of the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is set to enter into force on 12 June 2026.

The concept of safe countries of origin provides that asylum applications from people coming from states classified as "safe" may be processed under accelerated procedures. These procedures can be carried out directly at the borders of EU member states and in transit zones. As part of the CEAS reform, the Council and the Parliament have now provisionally agreed on the first EU-wide list of safe countries of origin. This list includes, among others, [Bangladesh](#), [Colombia](#), [Egypt](#), [India](#), [Kosovo](#), [Morocco](#) and [Tunisia](#).

The revision of the [safe third country concept](#) is also part of the [CEAS reform](#). Under these rules, asylum applications do not have to be examined if the

person concerned could have obtained protection in a non-EU country that is considered a safe third country. While previously the rejection of an asylum application required proof of a "[connection](#)" between the refugee and the safe third country, this is no longer strictly necessary. Instead, it is sufficient for one of the following three criteria to apply: there is some form of "[connection](#)" to the third country; the person has transited through a third country; or there is an agreement between an EU member state and a safe third country under which that country undertakes to examine asylum applications. This means that even mere transit through a safe third country can be enough for an asylum application in the EU not to be examined.

For Italy's [right-wing governing coalition](#), these EU-wide changes could give new political and legal momentum to the controversial reception and processing centres in Albania. According to calculations by the newspaper [il manifesto](#), these centres could be put back into operation as early as February. It is important to note, however, that member states such as Italy are not limited to the EU-wide list of safe countries of origin and may continue to maintain their own [national lists](#).

These decisions by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament clearly demonstrate how the externalisation of the European asylum system is being further advanced and taking on increasingly harsh forms. According to the newspaper [La Repubblica](#), human rights organisations are already preparing to challenge the compatibility of these reforms with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Geneva Refugee Convention. [Olivia Sundberg Diez](#), EU advocate on migration and asylum at Amnesty, has also sharply criticised the reforms. With regard to the revision of the safe third country rules, she speaks of an attack on European migration law. She also warns that the concept of safe countries of origin contributes to a situation in which protection claims are no longer assessed individually, potentially resulting in people in need being denied protection.

Similar criticism has been voiced by EU Member of Parliament [Cecilia Strada](#). She emphasises that financial incentives are the main reason why third

countries enter into agreements with EU states. In her view, this amounts to a “mercato globale per la vendita di esseri umani”, a global market for the trade in human beings.

One thing is clear: these measures further and severely restrict the right to asylum for many people seeking protection

Situation of refugees

September, 26 2025

Neglected by politics, exploited by criminal networks: how Italy systematically fails unaccompanied minor refugees

According to the semi-annual [report](#) by the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, a total of 16,497 unaccompanied minor refugees were registered in Italy at the end of June 2025 – 87.5% of them male. Most come from Egypt (24.6%), followed by Ukraine (19.5%), Gambia, Tunisia, and Guinea. Around 80% of these minors live in reception facilities, while approximately 20% – primarily children with Ukrainian citizenship – are housed with families, often relatives. Sicily remains the region hosting the highest number of unaccompanied minors. The cooperatives operating the reception centers there have been complaining for years about structural underfunding and a lack of state support. In mid-September, a [delegation](#) traveled to Rome to draw attention to overdue payments from the government, without which dignified accommodation and support for the minors is becoming increasingly impossible.

Criticism is also growing in northern Italy regarding the current administrative handling of unaccompanied minors: the mayors of six municipalities in Friuli Venezia Giulia, near the Slovenian border, recently addressed an [open letter](#) to the government. They are calling for national coordination of the accommodation of unaccompanied minors, arguing that municipalities are overwhelmed both financially and organizationally. However, at the heart of the criticism is not the well-being of the children, but rather a [power struggle between local and central authorities](#) – shaped by economic interests and party-political strategies. The mayors belong to the

right-wing parties Lega and Forza Italia, and accordingly, the discourse is marked by racist agitation against migration. What is presented as an administrative problem is, in reality, part of a politically calculated narrative that frames unaccompanied refugee children not as individuals in need of protection, but as a burden.

At the same time, a [deeply troubling trend](#) is emerging: more and more unaccompanied minors are falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation – both by international networks that deliberately lure them to Italy and quickly funnel them into local criminal structures, and by local mafia-style organizations that specifically exploit the fact that minors are not criminally liable. For these groups, the children represent low risk and low cost – they bear no legal or social responsibility. For many of the minors, drug dealing appears more attractive than the formal reception system, which offers hardly any legal income opportunities before the age of 18. Local criminal networks lure them with quick money and “payment” in the form of clothes or shoes – status symbols that hold strong appeal for many youths. NGOs are particularly [critical](#) of the lack of resources for psychosocial care, pointing out that most of the young people are severely traumatized, repeatedly exploited, and often struggling with substance dependence. In the political debate over responsibilities and resources, it is all too easy to forget what is truly at stake: the responsibility towards children and young people seeking protection.

November, 14 2025

A dysfunctional reception system restricts the access to asylum applications

While the temperatures are dropping, more and more newly arrived migrants in Italy are forced to sleep on the streets without access to provisions while awaiting the opportunity to begin the asylum process. Media reports focus especially on the situation in L’Aquila. However, the situation in L’Aquila is not an isolated incident. It appears to be a [consequence](#) of a national dysfunctional reception system. The reception facilities reach their maximum capacity and the local reception systems do not guarantee the right to submit an application for

international protection. Therefore asylum seekers look for cities, where they may have access to their right to apply for asylum.

Since mid-October, groups of asylum seekers have repeatedly arrived in L'Aquila, camping in front of the police station's immigration office. [A first group](#), which grew up to 45 persons, has been transferred to reception centers, after waiting nearly two weeks on the streets of L'Aquila for a process of their asylum registration. Before they were trapped in a bureaucratic limbo: though given an appointment to formalize their asylum claim for mid December, they were denied a place in a reception center, due to full local capacity. However, to formalize the application, migrants need a residency. If they have no access to a reception facility, they have no residency and their asylum application is blocked.

[Just shortly after](#) their transfer to reception facilities, more people arrived from different Italian cities to register their asylum application in L'Aquila. As some of them reported to the media they followed rumors on social media like TikTok, which said that the asylum procedure and access to reception facilities might be better there than in other places. They, too, were forced onto the streets as temperatures dropped to 3°C, relying entirely on the solidarity of civil society for food and blankets. But self-build shelters of blankets and cardboard were removed by the [city cleaning service](#) and a young man was taken to hospital suffering from hypothermia. [The second group](#) grew up to 41 and some of them waited nearly one week in the cold for a process. On October 12th they were transferred to reception facilities in Calabria and Basilicata. [On the same day](#) new asylum seekers arrived and the process will repeat itself.

While the [authorities in L'Aquila](#) fire up the discussion by framing the arrivals in L'Aquila as "remotely organized action" of profiteers, this narrative conveniently ignores well documented administrative failures in the national wide reception system. A similar situation to that in L'Aquila can be found in Siena or Trento. Also in [Rome](#) and [Bologna](#), migrants camp outside the immigration offices of the police for days, because only 15-30 people per day can enter to register their application. This is not only a problem of full facilities; it is a

systemical restriction of access to fundamental rights. [Reports](#) about a non uniformly and mismanaged reception system are nothing new. Instead of reforming the system and increasing the capacity to manage new arrivals, granting them access to humane care and their right to an asylum procedure, the Italian government is building more deportation centers and spends [over 670 million euros](#) on external deportation centers in Albania, which systematically violate human rights. The situation is not an unexpected consequence, it appears to be the anticipated consequence of a migration policy that does not care about the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.

Libya

Oktober, 17 2025

Europe's Complicity with Libya

This week once again demonstrated how closely Italy's political decisions are intertwined with the violence at Europe's external borders. While Parliament declared the Almasri case closed on Thursday, it voted only days later to extend the Italy–Libya Memorandum of Understanding, despite strong opposition. An attack last weekend by the so-called Libyan Coast Guard on a boat carrying people seeking protection once again illustrates the deadly consequences of this cooperation and the urgent need to resist it.

On 9 October 2025, the [Italian Chamber of Deputies](#) rejected the request by the Tribunale dei Ministri to open proceedings against Justice Minister Carlo Nordio, Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi, and Cabinet Secretary Alfredo Mantovano. The case concerns the release and return of Libyan General Osama Najim Almasri, a senior member of the so-called Special Deterrence Force ("Al-Radaa") and former commander of the Libyan Coast Guard, who has been linked by international organisations to torture, enforced disappearances, and ill-treatment of migrants. His swift repatriation to Libya—before the ICC could issue an extradition request—marked a deliberate political decision that placed foreign policy expediency above international law.

The three government members were accused of abuse of office and aiding an escape. According

to the investigation, Almasri was knowingly flown out of the country to prevent his extradition to the ICC, out of concern for possible repercussions against Italian interests in Libya. The [request for indictment](#) was rejected by the Committee on Immunity and Authorisations by 13 votes to 6 in three separate votes. The parliamentary decision means that the three ministers are politically and legally protected for now – the case is effectively closed.

On 14 October, a survivor of Almasri's abuses filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The claimant, a refugee from Sub-Saharan Africa, had been intercepted in the Mediterranean by the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, detained in several facilities under Almasri's control – including the Mitiga military base – tortured, and forced into labour. The complaint, supported by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), Refugees in Libya, and a team led by Andrea Saccucci and Chantal Meloni, challenges Italy's refusal to cooperate with the ICC and to extradite Almasri.

On 15 October, the Italian Parliament took another far-reaching decision: with 153 votes in favour, 112 against, and 9 abstentions, it approved the continuation of the so-called [Memorandum of Understanding](#) between Italy and Libya. The agreement, concluded in 2017 under then-Interior Minister Marco Minniti and Prime Minister Paolo [Gentiloni](#), has now been renewed by the Meloni government. According to human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières, and [Refugees in Libya](#), the agreements have contributed to the systematic detention, torture, and exploitation of migrants in Libyan camps. Opposition parties – including Partito Democratico, Alleanza Verdi-Sinistra, Italia Viva, and +Europa – unsuccessfully demanded that the agreement not be automatically renewed.

The pact includes support for the so-called Libyan Coast Guard. A [case](#) from last weekend once again highlights the deadly consequences of this cooperation. Survivors reported that the so-called Libyan Coast Guard fired on and rammed a boat. At least three people were seriously injured: one man suffered a gunshot wound to the head and is

in a coma, another was shot in the face, and a third in the leg. One of the victims is reportedly a [minor](#). The Italian Coast Guard brought the injured to Sicily, where they were taken to local hospitals. According to reports received by [Alarm Phone](#), at least one person was killed. Investigations have now been launched. The attack occurred about [100 nautical miles southeast of Malta](#), within the Maltese search and rescue zone. Frontex has confirmed that one of its aircraft observed the incident and, on the instruction of the Maltese Rescue Coordination Centre, issued a warning to the unidentified vessel manoeuvring dangerously close. Maltese authorities, however, did not intervene.

The full details of the case have not yet been clarified. What is certain, however, is that violence by the so-called Libyan Coast Guard and the failure to assist are not isolated incidents. Just a few days ago, Sea-Watch published a [report](#) documenting sixty cases since 2016 in which Libyan actors, primarily the so-called Coast Guard, attacked people on the move and their civilian rescuers. Sea-Watch stated: "We have been documenting the EU's construction of a system of crimes against humanity in the Mediterranean for years. Every new agreement with Libyan regimes, every extension of mandates, legitimizes this violence."

While ministers are politically shielded from accountability, cooperation with Libyan actors responsible for systematic abuse and torture continues. On Wednesday, [days of action](#) against the renewed Italy–Libya agreement will begin in Rome. Europe's policy of externalisation is not only enacted at its borders but also within the political spaces that deny responsibility. Borderline Europe joins the demands of [Refugees in Libya](#): Italy and the EU must end their support for Libyan actors responsible for crimes against refugees and migrants. Stop the Memorandum.

Italy–Albania agreement

November, 13 2025

Rome Summit: Meloni and Rama institutionalize the Albania model

Meloni and Rama held their first intergovernmental summit in Rome on 13 November, signing [16](#)

bilateral agreements in the fields of energy, defence, infrastructure and migration. Central to the meeting was the continued implementation of the Italy–Albania agreement on the externalization of migration procedures.

Meloni stated that the processing centres (CPRs) in Albania would “operate as planned” once the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum enters into force in June 2026. She defended the agreement as a European model that could be adopted by other EU member states. However, from the perspective of the opposition and critical observers, its implementation remains highly problematic: the centres are not functioning as intended despite substantial public spending, and the agreement severely restricts fundamental rights. It enables detention, rapid removals and procedures without adequate legal protection and a clear disenfranchisement of people seeking protection. Rama, by contrast, emphasised the exclusivity of the arrangement: such an agreement was “only possible with Italy”, and similar cooperation with other states was not envisaged. At the same time, Meloni announced that Albania's EU accession talks should advance further, with Italy's political support during its EU Council Presidency in 2028.

Both Meloni and Rama presented the agreement as a paradigm shift in migration management. The developments of 13 November clearly show that the Italy–Albania model is not being rolled back but expanded. Italy aims to place the centres explicitly under EU law in the future and to embed the model in European migration policy. The Albania model is not a solution, it stands for harsher border regimes and intensified externalization.

Labour exploitation

Dezember, 12 2025

The Flussi Decree and the Exploitation of Migrant Workers

Since the 1990s, Italy has regulated how many third-country nationals may enter each year for work. The government therefore sets quotas for seasonal and non-seasonal employment in the Decreto Flussi. Since 2001, this decree has been repeatedly

extended. Most recently, on November 26, the Senate set the quotas for the period 2026–2028. Additional contingents were created primarily for care workers. With the start of the citrus season, many people from third countries are currently also working on orange and lemon plantations in Sicily and other regions of southern Italy.

The Flussi Decree provides that an employer can submit an online application for the recruitment of a person from outside the EU at the Sportello Unico per l'Immigrazione (SUI). This day is called the “Click Day” and resembles a lottery. If the application is approved, the so-called nulla osta is issued, meaning the official authorization for recruitment and entry. This document must then be forwarded to the worker abroad so that they can apply for a work visa in their country of origin. After entering Italy, employer and employee meet at the competent prefecture to sign the residence contract. The application for a residence permit (permesso di soggiorno) is then submitted.

Since the Cutro Decree, however, the rules have been significantly tightened. In particular, already issued nulla osta were suspended for certain countries of origin. Legislative Decree 145/2024 changed the previous procedure under which a nulla osta was automatically granted if authorities did not respond in time (silenzio-assenso). For certain “high-risk states,” initially Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and from February 2025 additionally Morocco, this simplified procedure no longer applies. Applications already submitted were suspended until the end of 2025, and new applications now require a detailed review by the Questura as well as a preliminary check by the Labour Inspectorate. This results in thousands of people, especially from these countries, not receiving a visa for months despite having an approved work permit. Although the government, employers' associations and trade unions all acknowledge that the system in its current form does not function, the proposed reforms have so far focused almost exclusively on technical adjustments, such as spreading out the “Click Days” or improving the interconnection of databases.

But the criticism goes beyond the obvious administrative dysfunctionality. The Decreto Flussi

enables exploitative labour relations and creates dependencies instead of guaranteeing legal, reliable and fair access to the labour market. The trade union [CGIL](#) therefore demands structural changes: sanctions for companies that request a nulla osta but then do not activate employment contracts, a residence permit for job searching, protection mechanisms for those who report exploitation, and a comprehensive regularisation of people who already live and work in the country but do not have a valid residence permit.

We share this criticism and call for dignified living and working conditions for all. The Decreto Flussi once again demonstrates a security- and order-oriented migration policy that has shaped Italian politics not only under Meloni but for 25 years: migration is capitalised upon and ultimately comes at the expense of the people who are exploited and pushed into illegality.

CPR

Oktober, 30 2025

New Detention Centers (CPR) Planned in Tuscany and Trentino

On October 24, 2025, Italy's Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi and the President of the Province of Trentino, Maurizio Fugatti, signed an agreement to establish a *Centro di permanenza per i rimpatri (CPR)* in Trento. There, people without residence permits or with deportation orders are to be detained for up to 180 days. Many of them reach northern Trentino via the [Balkan route](#). According to the press release, the CPR is to open in 2026 and will provide space for [25 people on approximately 2,700 square meters](#), which appears disproportionate. The project is financed with [1.5 million euros](#) from provincial funds, while the Ministry of the Interior will cover operation and maintenance costs. [Civil society organizations](#) such as Centro Astalli, Atas Onlus, and Punto d'Incontro sharply criticize the planned facility in Trento—not only because the reduction of reception places threatens to push hundreds of people into homelessness. Moreover, new CPRs are an expression of right-wing symbolic politics that criminalize migration and sell deportations as internal security.

The central government is also planning a new CPR in [Tuscany](#). While the mayors of the right-governed cities of Arezzo, Siena, and Grosseto welcome the initiative, it faces opposition from the Tuscan regional government. Regional President [Eugenio Giani](#) of the Democratic Party (PD) criticizes the plans: CPRs are ineffective, marked by human rights violations, and in urgent need of fundamental reform. The government in Rome, however, intends to proceed without regional approval. Thereby, Interior Minister [Piantedosi](#) follows a line already applied in other regions.

We support the demands of the [Tuscan petition](#) and condemn the establishment of new CPRs. We oppose both deportation detention and the inhumane conditions in these facilities. Migration must not be criminalized, as the lack of a residence permit is not a crime.

Further information on the situation in Italy can be found under "Projects" on our [Homepage](#), in previous issues of [Scirocco](#) and in our Spotlight "[Lost Lives, Unfold Stories](#)".



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The Scirocco is published since 2023 with the kind support of the Evangelical Church in the Rhineland (EKIR))

Coverphoto: Wolfgang Hasselmann, unsplash