
Quarterly Recap Nr.2: April – June 2026

borderline-europe, Sizilien

SCIROCCO

News from Italy
Quarterly Recap



Scirocco [*ʃi ˈrɒkko-Schirokko*] is a hot, strong south-easterly wind that carries dust and sand across the Mediterranean to Sicily and northern Italy, often lasting only a few hours. This newsflash has been regularly published since 2023 and is now issued as a timeline on our website since June 2025. This is its quarterly recap outlining the most important topics.

Italy's migration policy

April, 29 2026

The instrumentalization of penal power: Another undemocratic security decree

The government of Giorgia Meloni has once again introduced a new decree-law as part of the broader package of "security decrees" announced in February and March 2026 (see our previous Scirocco analyses: February 23, 2026: Fundamental rights violations pushed through a draft law). This move fits into a wider strategy that increasingly relies on [criminal law as a tool to expand the powers of law enforcement authorities](#). Within this framework, specific groups, particularly people on the move and, more broadly, marginalized communities associated with so-called "deviance"—are implicitly constructed as threats to public order and social decorum. Decree-laws, however, are legislative instruments that the Italian Constitution reserves for "[extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency](#)." Their repeated use in the field of migration policy further underscores the ongoing securitization of this domain.

In parallel with Italy's promotion of "voluntary return programmes" (see our [latest Scirocco](#) on the topic), the new security decree, recently approved by the Senate, introduces a [controversial provision](#): the Ministry of the Interior will be authorized to enter into agreements with the National Bar Council (CNF), the institutional body representing lawyers, to facilitate so-called "voluntary repatriation" schemes. The idea was to provide [a financial incentive of €615](#) to lawyers who assist foreign nationals opting into such programmes. The Security Decree introduced by the far right seems to be part of their wider strategy on "remigration"¹. [The same amendment](#) also targets deportations following criminal convictions, which may be imposed as an alternative penalty in certain cases. Under the new rules, the supervising judge must prioritize requests for deportation over any other petitions and issue a decision within fifteen days. At the same time, the decree introduces a deeply problematic

contradiction: it effectively removes legal aid for migrants who challenge deportation orders in court, while simultaneously offering financial incentives to lawyers who encourage their clients to leave the country. Beyond reinforcing the government's narrative of reducing migration and facilitating removals, this measure raises serious concerns about the role and [independence of legal defense](#). Lawyers are ethically bound to act exclusively in the best interests of their clients, not to respond to financial incentives that may influence legal advice. These concerns have not gone unnoticed. [The President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella](#), has already questioned the constitutionality of the decree and signaled that he will refuse to sign it unless the provision on lawyers' compensation is removed.

In response, Fratelli d'Italia, Meloni's party, attempted to identify legal and procedural workarounds. [The Prime Minister](#) left the security package unchanged to prevent it from expiring and last Friday passed a separate decree with the amendments shortly after parliament gave final approval to the original text. In short, the government has stipulated that assistance with repatriation does not necessarily have to be provided by a lawyer, but may also be provided by other professionals. [As a result, the bonus will](#) not be paid solely to lawyers, but to all professionals designated to assist with voluntary repatriation procedures. Furthermore, it will be paid upon completion of the administrative procedure and no longer upon the person's actual departure. However, the separate decree has to be approved again which undermines the failure of Meloni's continued securitization strategy and the government's tactic to overturn democratic principles.

To sum up, what emerges is a broader and more troubling pattern: [penal power is no longer constrained by, nor oriented toward, the protection of fundamental rights](#). Instead, it is increasingly instrumentalized to advance an ideology of public order and security, one that risks criminalizing social marginality, silencing dissent, and restricting democratic freedoms. In doing so, it narrows the already limited space for collective political expression and action.

¹ The term 'remigration' is problematic because it has been ideologically redefined by figures associated with the New Right and is now frequently used as a euphemism for the mass deportation or expulsion of people with a migratory background.

June, 10 2026

The UN Raises Alarm: Italy fails to implement the UN Convention against Torture

Italy is facing scrutiny over its compliance with the *UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*. In its latest [concluding observations](#), the UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) identified serious shortcomings in Italy's implementation of the convention, including Italy's definition of torture, the prison conditions and Italy's migration policies. These concerns echo longstanding criticism raised by civil society organizations and come at a time when European migration policies increasingly prioritize deterrence and forced returns over protection and safeguarding of people on the move.

The UNCAT was [established in 1984](#) to monitor the implementation of the *UN Convention against Torture* and is comprised of ten independent experts. In their concluding observations on Italy, the UNCAT criticises many aspects of Italy's migration policies that have long been under criticism by civil society organizations: the agreements with Libya and Albania, the breach of the right to non-refoulement, the inhumane conditions in the Pre-Removal Detention Centers (CPRs) and the criminalization of civil sea rescue operations. Italy must provide information on the actions it will take in response to these recommendations by May 1, 2027, which will be reviewed in the UNCAT's next periodic report.

Another major gap in Italy's implementation of the UN Convention was highlighted by the *Italian Network for the Support of Torture Survivors (RESST)*: the failure to uphold the right to rehabilitation for torture victims. This issue is particularly relevant in the case of people on the move arriving in Italy from Libya or Tunisia, places where human rights abuses and torture of migrants are well-documented. According to an estimate by [Avvenire](#), 17,000 victims of abuse and torture have arrived in Italy in 2025 alone. However, the report found that beyond the treatment of externally visible vulnerabilities, rehabilitation opportunities for torture victims are scarce. While guidelines do exist, they are found to be poorly implemented, if at all. This is reflected by the fact that CAS facilities (the most common reception facility for people on the move) are not required to have a psychologist. Meanwhile, the SAI reception system, which is intended to

accommodate vulnerable migrants, lacks sufficient spaces.

These reports were published at a time when both Italian and European politics are further turning toward dehumanizing policies. In a recent [Scirocco](#) we reported on the Council of Europe's Chişinău Declaration, which aims at reinterpreting the article of the European Convention on Human Rights that prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. This reinterpretation would result in weaker human rights protection for non-EU citizens. Furthermore, the return regulations, which were agreed upon last week by the EU, will further undermine the right to non-refoulement. In this context, the UN and RESST reports must be understood not only as a criticism of current politics but also a warning-signal about Italy's and the EU's plans to further erode safeguarding against torture and ill-treatment. Although the committee's recommendations are not legally binding, they increase international pressure on the Italian government and strengthen legal and advocacy efforts.

Italy-Albania agreement

May, 05 2026

The Italy-Albania deal: "Compatible with EU law" — but at what cost?

The Italy–Albania protocol on migration "is compatible with EU legislation" only insofar as migrants' rights are "fully protected." This is the conclusion of [Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou](#) at the European Court of Justice. But what does "compatible with EU law" mean in practice—and at what cost? Emiliou suggests that, "in principle," both the protocol and the relevant Italian legislation could be considered compatible with EU law, particularly the Return Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive.

[The](#) ECJ had already examined the case in August last year, following a referral from the Court of Rome, which has repeatedly questioned the legality of detaining migrants rescued in the Mediterranean and transferred to Albania on the basis that they come from countries Italy deems "safe," such as Egypt and Bangladesh. A final ruling is still pending, but the Advocate General's opinion may significantly influence the outcome.

This makes it crucial to scrutinize the realities on the ground. Emiliou himself stressed that migrants' rights must be fully protected. Regarding our latest reports (see our [Scirocco of 9th March 2026](#)) most people that were brought to Albania had lived in Italy for years but lost their jobs and, as a consequence, their residence permits. They face de facto detention, without any criminal record. A lot of people do not even get information about why they are deported to Albania. [The obstruction of legal aid](#) that Italian authorities use to avoid accountability for allegations of abuse continues with the ongoing deportations of people to Albania. Moreover, as reported by [Avvenire](#), residents that live close to the center in Gjader reported hearing people shout inside the detention center on a regular basis, as well as many incidents about people trying to get to the hospital in order to escape from the center. [Meanwhile Meloni's party Fratelli d'Italia \(Fdi\)](#) and the party [Forza Italia](#) are using the centers in Albania as a political strategy and instrumentalize the "less arrivals" rhetoric in order to distract from the cruelty and procedural inefficiency of the Albanian centers. Following a visit, MP Sara Kelany described the Gjader center as ["operating at full capacity,"](#) citing 82 detainees out of approximately 96 places. Similarly, Alessandro Battilocchio argued that reduced irregular arrivals show [Italy is "on the right track."](#)

Again, the decline in arrival numbers is mentioned by members of parliament without considering rising deaths of people on the move trying to cross the Mediterranean. Additionally, several rulings by Italian courts rejecting the detention of people in the Albanian centers emphasize that the deal is far from being compatible with international law. Additionally, Fdi and Forza Italia completely ignore [Italy's colonial legacy in Albania](#). Giorgia Meloni speaks of a "historical friendship" between Albania and Italy, overlooking the less-than-friendly history when Italy invaded Albania during the fascist regime. It's interesting to note how Italy is leveraging former colonies to form agreements aimed at restricting migration. In order to safeguard human rights, the focus on detention measures and repatriation within migration management needs to stop. This system of containment and securitization only leads to further

European migration policy

May, 22 2026

The Chişinău Declaration: Europe's abandonment of universal human rights protection

An explicit and deeply concerning objective was at the intention of last Friday's meeting of the Council of Europe in Chişinău, Moldova; the weakening of protections for migrants in Europe. The meeting was preceded by an open letter published last year, initiated by Italy and Denmark and signed by nine member states, calling for a revision of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In the letter, the states demanded ["greater room for manoeuvre at national level"](#) as well as ["innovative solutions"](#) to combat irregular migration, [fully in line with the colonial and propagandistic Italy-Albania agreement](#), such as the externalization of "return hubs" and agreements with non-EU transit states.

While the letter initially had no immediate consequences, a declaration was signed last Friday in Chişinău that builds upon the same political demands. It advocates for a [new interpretation of the ECHR](#) under which the rights of non-EU citizens would receive weaker protection. One consequence would be the legalization of deportations of convicted non-EU nationals, even in cases involving family separation or degrading detention conditions in their countries of origin.

The [declaration](#) specifically targets the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the interpretation of Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. In the future, [exceptions to human rights protections](#) could be permitted in certain cases, with national authorities, rather than the Court itself deciding when such exceptions apply. This risks reinforcing a familiar pattern of framing human rights and national security as [inherently conflicting](#), and using the vague, open-ended interpretation of ["national security"](#) can to further erode the rights of migrants.

Although this alarming declaration is not legally binding, it exerts political pressure on courts and authorities. This pressure is also directed at the negotiations on new migration policy regulations, which are currently in [the trilogue phase](#) and will resume in the European Parliament next week. The goal is to reach a [final agreement](#) by summer. The moment we warned about just a few weeks ago in our [Scirocco](#) has now arrived. The dangerous

pattern of the Italian migration system has now officially succeeded in becoming a model for other EU member states.

While Meloni is celebrated as a heroine on social media, the gravity of the declaration is increasingly being overshadowed. As the ECHR expert group Agora states in a recent [declaration](#), the adoption of this text represents a historic turning point: for the first time, the Council of Europe is explicitly pursuing the long-term restriction of human rights protections for specific groups of people. Another clear sign of the EU's ongoing retreat from the idea of universal human rights protection.

June, 12 2026

Implementation of CEAS: How the New Asylum Law Reform Restricts the Fundamental Rights of People on the Move

Today, the tightening of European asylum law in the form of the new [Common European Asylum System](#) (CEAS) comes into force across Europe. It was adopted by the EU on April 10, 2024, following more than eight years of negotiations. While we have been reporting on developments surrounding CEAS for some time, we would like to use today's implementation as an opportunity to take a closer look at the biggest changes the reform brings and the impact this will have on the rights of people on the move.

Through the tightening to the European asylum law, unlawful practices that have been in use for years in countries such as Italy and Greece are being legalized and normalized. While the old asylum law was primarily based on directives, thus leaving member states considerable leeway in implementation, most of the regulations under the CEAS reform have been enacted in the form of regulations. From today these are binding and uniform in every member state's law. The most significant changes concern the screening procedure, the asylum border procedure, and the "safe" third country rule. These changes are discussed in more detail below.

The Screening Procedure

The [screening procedure](#) is enshrined in the new Screening Regulation. Every person who enters the EU irregularly across an external border must undergo it. During the procedure, the person is identified, a preliminary health and vulnerability assessment is conducted, and biometric data is collected and recorded in the EURODAC database.

In addition, an assessment is made as to whether the person could pose a "[threat to internal security](#)". Overall, the procedure may last no more than seven days at the EU's external border and only three days within the EU. During this brief period, the course is set for which procedure the person will subsequently be referred to: the regular asylum procedure, the asylum border procedure, or an accelerated procedure. During the procedure at the external border, a legal [fiction of "non-entry"](#) applies; thus, legally, the person is not in the EU. As a result, individuals have limited access to fundamental rights that would otherwise apply, and both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Geneva Convention on Refugees are circumvented.

The screening procedure severely restricts the **right to personal liberty**, as individuals are effectively detained during the process. This right is enshrined, among other places, in Article 6 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union](#) (CFREU) and in Article 3 of the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#) (UDHR). The **right to legal protection** (Art. 10 UDHR) and the **right to an effective remedy** (Art. 47 CFR) are also not guaranteed, as no legal remedy is provided for during the screening procedure. This is justified by the claim that no decision is made in the screening procedure that directly affects the rights of the person concerned. However, this does not correspond to reality, as the nature of the asylum procedure is determined here.

The assessment of vulnerability in such a short time is also highly questionable. Many forms of vulnerability and disability, such as the effects of trauma or invisible disabilities, are not immediately apparent and require more time to be recognized. At the same time, these determinations have a significant impact on the further treatment and classification of the person seeking protection. Furthermore, there are concerns regarding data protection. During the screening process, biometric data is collected starting at [age 6](#), and this data will also be accessible to local police authorities. This poses a risk of data misuse, and could result in a sharp rise of cases of *racial profiling*. This is inconsistent with the **right to the protection of personal data** (Art. 8 CFREU) and the **right to respect for private and family life** (Art. 7 CFREU, Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights).

The Asylum Border Procedure and the Accelerated Procedure

Both procedures are established in the [Asylum Procedure Regulation](#). The aim of the asylum border procedure is to detain people on the move near the border in order to facilitate their removal in the event of a negative decision and to prevent them from traveling on to other Member States. During the asylum border procedure, the legal fiction of “non-entry” continues to apply.

The [asylum border procedure](#) is mandatory for persons who are nationals of a third country with a [recognition rate of less than 20%](#) (e.g., Turkey or Russia), who are accused of intentionally deceiving the authorities or destroying their identity documents, or who are alleged to pose a threat to national security. In addition, a border asylum procedure may also be applied if the asylum application was filed in a transit zone or at the border, or if the person was apprehended in connection with an illegal border crossing or rescued from distress at sea. These broad criteria provide Member States with considerable leeway to expand the scope of border procedures.

The purpose of the procedure is to assess the admissibility of the asylum application, particularly with regard to the possibility of returning the individual to their home country or to a “safe” third country. The border procedure is similar to the regular asylum procedure, but with shorter time limits. The asylum application must be filed within five days, and the procedure may last no longer than twelve weeks. During the procedure, individuals at the borders remain detained in closed centers, which severely restricts their **right to liberty** (Art. 6 CFREU, Art. 3 UDHR). Furthermore, the **right to legal protection** (Art. 10 UDHR) and the **right to an effective remedy** (Art. 47 UDHR) are not sufficiently guaranteed, as is the case of the screening procedure. Free legal information is not automatically provided, but only upon request. While there is, in principle, a right to legal representation, the costs must be borne by the asylum seeker themselves. For many asylum seekers, this poses a significant hurdle and hinders access to effective legal protection. The **prohibition on discrimination** based, among other things, on country of origin, as enshrined in the [Geneva Convention on Refugees](#) (Art. 3 GCR), is also undermined by the border procedure. In particular, the 20% rule and the expanded concept of “safe” countries of origin make it more difficult for marginalized groups from these countries — such as queer individuals or those facing political persecution — to present their individual stories of flight. The blanket classification of entire groups of

origin increases the risk of unlawful deportations. This also violates the **principle of non-refoulement** (Art. 33 GCR).

The accelerated procedure is largely similar to the border procedure, with the difference that it does not take place at external borders. Here, too, shortened deadlines apply, and access to legal protection is severely restricted.

The “safe” third-country rule

In February of this year, with the votes of the far-right factions in the European Parliament, a tightening of the [“safe” third-country rule](#) was adopted. Asylum applications can be rejected on the grounds that the individuals could have sought asylum in a so-called “safe” third country, without a [comprehensive substantive review of the grounds for asylum](#). The threshold for classifying a country as “safe” is extremely low. Ratification of the Geneva Convention on Refugees may be sufficient for this purpose, though it is not strictly required if the state can guarantee so-called “effective protection.” Furthermore, individual regions within a state may also be classified as “safe.”

While a direct connection between the affected person and such a third country was originally required (such as a prolonged stay), this requirement was relaxed in February 2026. Now, merely transiting through a third country may suffice, or, if there is a corresponding agreement with the third country, no connection is necessary at all to deport a person there. This regulation opens the door to outsourcing asylum procedures to third countries and increases the risk of deportation to countries where the human rights of those affected are not adequately protected. This can further undermine the **principle of non-refoulement** (Art. 33 of the Geneva Convention). This regulation does [not apply to unaccompanied minors](#).

Minors

The CEAS reform also significantly restricts the [rights of minors](#). Minors are generally not exempt from either the screening procedure or the asylum border procedure. They are required to be accompanied by adult family members or special representatives. Minors can thus also be detained in border centers for up to three months and, under the accelerated procedure, are effectively treated the same as adults. Unaccompanied minors must undergo a border procedure if they are classified as a [“security threat”](#). The shortened deadlines make it difficult to properly appoint a guardian and provide adequate legal representation for unaccompanied minors. This treatment of minors contradicts the **principle of**

the best interests of the child, which is enshrined in Article 3 of the [UN Convention on the Rights of the Child](#). This is clearly violated in the CEAS measures concerning minors.

Conclusion

The tightening of asylum law nullifies or circumvents numerous rights of people on the move that are enshrined in international and European law. The reform makes it clear that right-wing narratives are increasingly taking precedence over human rights in Europe. CEAS is primarily aimed at further restricting migration and deporting people as directly as possible from the border. This makes access to protection considerably more difficult. Precisely for this reason, it is more important today than ever not to accept these political developments without protest, but to mount political and legal resistance. International law provides a central point of reference for denouncing these injustices.

June, 26 2026

Return Hubs: The EU Disposes of Its Responsibility

After months of negotiations, the EU Council, the Parliament, and the Commission have agreed on the most significant change to European migration policy in decades. Just a few days after the implementation of the CEAS, the political center joined far-right forces and voted for a fundamental overhaul of EU return procedures. At the heart of this overhaul are the so-called 'Return Hubs', which are detention centres located outside the EU. These hubs are intended for individuals without valid residency status. After the bill was passed, lawmakers from the right wing, including German AfD lawmakers, clapped along to chants of "Send them back".

Until now, people with rejected asylum applications could only be deported to their countries of origin or to states with which they have a demonstrable connection. As early as March, representatives from Germany, Austria, Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands met with the explicit intention of loosening exactly these rules. The blueprint for the planned tightening measures is Italy's Albania Deal. The agreed regulations still require formal confirmation by the EU Parliament and member states, and could enter into force within the coming weeks. Under the new law, refugees could be forcibly transferred to return hubs in third countries, where they would await final deportation, even if

they have no connection to those countries. In practice, these facilities are equivalent to prisons: those held there would not be permitted to leave the premises. This would apply to minors too; even children could be detained there alongside their parents. In addition, the maximum detention period for individuals awaiting deportation would increase from six months to up to two years. For individuals classified as a "security risk", indefinite detention could become possible, despite the term remaining deliberately vague. One EU official put it plainly: "The goal is to send people to their country of origin. If this is not possible, we would wait until it is possible.". As a result, people could be held for months or even years in a country entirely foreign to them, solely on the basis of a rejected asylum application.

Another element of the regulations is the obligation for refugees to cooperate fully with authorities. In practice, this could grant local police and migration agencies sweeping powers to search individuals and "relevant premises", yet another deliberately broad formulation. Consequences could include home raids, seizure of phones or laptops, and severe violations of privacy. Once again, the sole justification is often a rejected asylum application. These measures are increasingly reminiscent of the repressive tactics employed by ICE. At the same time, entry bans would be drastically tightened. The existing five-year maximum could be increased to ten years, and for those falling under the broadly defined "security risk" category, lifetime bans would become conceivable.

Just weeks ago, 17 EU member states signed the Chişinău Declaration, calling for a broader interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically targeting Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The motivation is obvious: the planned outsourcing of deportation procedures to third countries directly conflicts with this fundamental standard, given the far more precarious detention conditions and severely limited legal protections in those states. Similar outsourcing models have already proven inhumane, costly and counterproductive. Time and again, they have resulted in refugees being exposed to violence, abuse, exploitation and death. By transferring people to non-EU states, the EU increasingly evades its direct responsibility, offloads oversight and accountability onto third countries, and reproduces colonial structures. The current regulation, the Chişinău Declaration and the CEAS are the ultimate consequence of an increasingly restrictive EU asylum policy: detention periods are expanding, safeguards are being

dismantled, and the risk of serious human rights violations is growing. It is also the clearest sign yet that right-wing and far-right narratives no longer merely influence European migration policy, they now drive it. Detaining people in closed facilities outside Europe deepens trauma, isolation and the stripping of rights. Instead of keeping those seeking protection out of Europe at any cost and outsourcing responsibility to third countries, what is needed are real investments in reception, care and integration. Stay informed about the developments surrounding the CEAS implementation and stand up against the European deportation system and the ongoing erosion of fundamental rights.

Situation of Migrants & Refugees in Italy

May, 20 2026

The extraordinary reception centres – an extraordinary system becomes the norm

On 30 April 2026, the State Police and the Prefecture's Inspectorate closed two extraordinary reception centres (CAS) located in the Leonforte area in Sicily due to serious sanitary issues. The occupants were transferred to other facilities in the vicinity. A newly published report by ActionAid and openpolis shows that this case is not an exception but reflects a widespread pattern.

The report "[La frontiera, ovunque](#)" from April 2026 (The Border Everywhere) debunks the Italian government's narrative of a "migration crisis" and instead demonstrates how this state of "emergency" is being fabricated through political decisions. The system of extraordinary reception centres (CAS), originally [created as a temporary solution](#) to fill gaps in ordinary reception facilities during periods of high arrivals, has become the norm. In 2024, the CAS facilities hosted 71.9% of people in the reception system, while the Reception and Integration System (SAI), which is intended to be the ordinary system, hosted only 24.7%.

CAS facilities offer fewer services and inclusion pathways than the SAI system, trapping people in precarious situations without adequate access to integration support. The report also highlights a strong trend towards larger facilities and the growth of profit-oriented operators. As a result, centres increasingly focus not on providing high-quality services to their residents but rather on cutting costs

and improving operational efficiency. This further [standardises their operation](#) and ignores the needs of individuals. Consequently, the focus of the system is shifting from providing reception and integration support to mere containment of People on the Move.

Following this trend several severe issues emerge. Many CAS facilities are overcrowded – in 2024, almost one thousand out of a total of six thousand centres were operating over capacity – while centres in other regions still had many free spaces available. In 2023, at least 823 unaccompanied minors were accommodated in facilities for adults. Although this is allowed under decree 133/2023 only under exceptional circumstances where there is no space in adequate reception facilities, the practice appears to become normalised. Even though the decree allows only temporary accommodation for up to 90 days, longer periods are becoming increasingly common, with the longest recorded stay reaching 1,413 days. ActionAid reports that the accommodation of minors in adult centres occurs even when places are available in centres dedicated to their needs. This exposes some of the most vulnerable people to even greater risks and limits their access to education and age-appropriate services.

The case of Leonforte has shown that inspections are extremely important in ensuring that centres adhere to minimum standards. However, the report highlights that inspections cover only 19.1% of facilities, with significant geographical disparities. Moreover, even when inspections are carried out, they are often limited to formal checks.

More recently, in [Vignanello](#), a town in Lazio, opposition has formed against government plans to build a new CAS facility in a former nightclub located in an industrial area. They have [collected over 2000 signatures](#) in the town and surrounding municipalities against these plans. Instead, local actors are calling for the investment and expansion of the SAI system, including widespread integration, training and job placement projects. They oppose the creation of new spaces of segregation and instead advocate for policies based on genuine integration, developed together with the local communities and their social realities.

The report and the cases of Leonforte and Vignanello illustrate how the Italian government is using the narrative of a "migration crisis" to justify exceptional measures within the Italian reception system and the lowering of standards. This has allowed a system intended only for exceptional

situations to become the norm. As a result, some of the most vulnerable people arriving in Italy are exposed to greater risks, preventing People on the Move from fully accessing the rights to which they are entitled.

Further information on the situation in Italy can be found under "Projects" on our [Homepage](#), in earlier issues of [Scirocco](#) and in our Spotlight "[Lost Lives, Untold Stories](#)".



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