

**ILLEGAL PUSH-BACKS
& BORDER VIOLENCE
& REPORTS**

**BALKAN NIGHT
MAY 2019**




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General

Methodology

The methodological process for these reports leverages the close social contact that we have as independent volunteers with refugees and migrants to monitor push-backs in the Western Balkans. When individuals return with significant injuries or stories of abuse, one of our violence reporting volunteers will sit down with the individuals to collect their testimonies. Although the testimony collection itself is typically with a group no larger than five persons, the pushback groups which they represent can be as large as 65 persons. We have a standardized framework for our interview structure which blends the collection of hard data (dates, geo-locations, officer descriptions, photos of injuries/medical reports, etc.) with open narratives of the abuse.

Terminology

The term *pushback* is a key component of the situation that unfolded along the EU borders (Hungary and Croatia) with Serbia in 2016, after the closure of the Balkan route. Push-back describes the informal expulsion (without due process) of an individual or group to another country. This lies in contrast to the term “deportation”, which is conducted in a legal framework. Push-backs have become an important, if unofficial, part of the migration regime of EU countries and elsewhere.

Abbreviations

BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina

HR - Croatia

SRB - Serbia

SLO - Slovenia

EU - European Union

MNE - Montenegro

Update on the situation

General

Angela Merkel's visit to Zagreb

German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Zagreb this month in the buildup preceding the EU parliamentary elections. On the 18th of May, she attended a rally hosted by the ruling HDZ party. Reciprocating the two visits already made to Berlin by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, her appearance was timely, providing assurances on Germany's continued support for Croatia's border arrangements, only a year before Croatia assumes the responsibilities of the EU Presidency, which rotates every 6 months. It is pertinent to note that in her previous statements, the Chancellor has delivered firm praise for the securitization policies developed by Croatia to strengthen their borders with BiH and Serbia.

What Merkel described as "[progress](#)" in 2018, was in fact the entrenchment of extrajudicial violence and the circumvention of international asylum law on a systematic scale. It should be noted, however, that since reporting on these "push-back" tactics has broken into the mainstream media, EU leaders have had to become more subtle in their advocacy of such frontier policies. Merkel has, for example, attempted to [distance herself](#) from the excesses of the Viktor Orban's securitization efforts in Hungary.



Posters placed around Zagreb in May by local activists in response to Merkel's visit ([H-Alter](#))

While the application of aggressive border policy may not be condoned openly, the role of state visits such as this are instrumental in forming the discursive power of Fortress Europe, and goes hand-in-hand with the logistical support delivered via Frontex and legal mechanisms such as chartered deportations. What's more, the odes made by the German Chancellor towards

Croatia's accession to the Schengen Area seem to further corroborate the leverage of EU power to meet conservative territorial objectives. The compatibility of militarized borders with the criteria required for Schengen status may seem paradoxical, but this dissonance is being instrumentalized by Croatia's EU partners in order to aid and abet their efforts to create an impermeable barrier to refugee movement through the Balkans. These inconsistencies were not lost on critics within Croatia who distributed [posters](#) of the Chancellor, picturing her over the background of a refugee beaten by Croatian border police. Inset is her 2015 statement "Wir schaffen das" ("We can do it"), which opened her governments more conciliatory approach to migration but now rings hollow when pitted against the violent border practices she is complicit in.

Update on the situation in BiH

SRF Footage of Push-backs and the local response

On May 15th, the Swiss broadcaster SRF published a [reportage](#) documenting a series of push-backs from Croatia to BiH near the village of Gradina (BiH), in the municipality of Velika Kladuša (BiH). Reporter Nicole Voegelé and her crew documented four push-backs over the course of two days, in which Croatian police pushed back at least 70 individuals - most of whom hailed from Afghanistan, Algeria, and Pakistan - from Croatia into Bosnia. The crew obtained clear footage of the return of one of these groups. As N1 later [wrote](#) of the video:

“After stopping near the border in a forested area, the group, carrying backpacks and blankets, is herded by a police officer, who then leads them to a concrete demarcation block and points instructs them to walk back into Bosnian territory. “

When interviewed later, several of the individuals described being pushed back by Croatian authorities who stole their phones, money, and belongings. Other groups reported being hit by these officers. Complementing previous footage and documentation, the SRF video footage presents the most clear-cut evidence to date of a Croatian collective expulsion in action.

Stills from SRF footage



The uniforms worn by the officers shown in this video appear to match those worn by Interventna Policija officers

The regional response to this footage was strong. For its own part, the Croatian Ministry of the Interior issued a [press release](#) in response to the video, denying all accusations that the footage depicted an illegal collective expulsion, instead framing the footage as depicting the practice of "discouraging" people-in-transit from entering the country irregularly:

"The video shows police officers who are carrying out official activities with the aim of discouraging multiple persons from illegal entry who tried to cross the border and illegally enter the EU at a location which is not a designated border crossing point, in conformity with the powers referred to in Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code. Moreover, the video does not show any use of force whatsoever by police officers against the persons being discouraged."

Furthermore, regional broadcasters and media outlets picked up the story with rigor ([N1](#), [Oslobođenje](#), [Klix](#), the [Sarajevo Times](#), [Total Croatia News](#), and [Factor](#) all ran stories).

Independent Volunteers Organizations

On May 22nd, the work of the Sarajevo-based independent NGO *Aid Brigade* was effectively shut down by BiH authorities. Around 20 police officers and officers from the Office of the Service for Foreigner's Affairs (SFA) arrived to the organization's Community Center and requested that the premises be closed immediately. Volunteers present at the location were questioned and ultimately banned from BiH for a year. Some of these expulsions were due to the volunteers overstaying their legal amount of time in the country, other volunteers were banned due to not having a valid white registration card - both of which are violations of the required behavior for foreigners in the country. Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that several volunteers who had fulfilled these requirements were also banned from the country to the comparatively murky grounds of "providing assistance to migrants" while "volunteering under a tourist visa". *Aid Brigade* was not a registered organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina leaving it exposed to these procedures. That being said, the organization had been in the process of applying for legal registration in the country for over five months. The group had been active in supporting people in transit in Sarajevo for more than a year, the shutdown led to the complete cessation of the organisation's activities.

While acknowledging the heavy-handed behavior of the SFA and BiH authorities in the management of this process, it is important to debate how to make international NGOs' work less volatile and more engaged and deeply rooted in local civil society. Ultimately, the development of local connections and coordination with local advocacy work is the most sustainable way to ensure the longevity and efficacy of this sort of assistance. This being understood, it is also important to contextualize the political headwinds which may have brought about this shutdown.

While some volunteers broke the legal requirements for foreigners in the country, and the organizations was never registered legally within the country, the modality and timing of this shutdown perhaps hints towards deeper truths about its intentionality. For much of the past year in Sarajevo, and to a lesser extent the Una Sana Canton, the work of unregistered, international solidarity groups such as Aid Brigade were tolerated if not welcomed by authorities. This was particularly true during the initial influx of people-in-transit to the country during the first nine months of 2018 when institutional assistance channels were overwhelmed. Following the initial influx however, a myriad of IOM-run camps began to spring up across the country (Miral, Usivak, converted Borici, Bira, and Sedra). The development of camp capacity then coincided with a refocusing of efforts to contain refugees and migrants within these, often poorly equipped, EU-funded camps. Since then, independent groups providing assistance outside of the official camps have, by and large, experienced more strained relationships with state and municipal actors. The practice of authorities “looking the other way”, in regards to unregistered organizations and volunteers, appears to have eroded through this period as well.

In some ways, a parallel to BiH can be found in the dynamics of refugee assistance work in Belgrade (SRB) after the closure of EU borders in March, 2016. In this environment, the relationship between independent/international solidarity groups and the state followed a similar trend of initial co-existence and toleration which later gave way to tensions following the development of camp infrastructure. The situation of people-in-transit suddenly caught within the country after March, 2016 resulted in a [large build-up](#) of people-in-transit living in a series of abandoned factories behind the main train station in Belgrade, informally referred to as the Barracks. Since it was not an official camp, state and institutional assistance was sparse and a number of local and international solidarity groups and organizations moved to fill the gap. A number of these groups were unregistered organizations or informal collections of volunteers. The work of these groups was challenged by an “[Open Letter](#)” penned by the Serbian state in November, 2016 which told NGOs and solidarity activists in the city to cease the distribution of food and clothing to people living in the Barracks, arguing that they should register in reception camps. Around this time, the state also [forced](#) two Serbian NGOs (Refugee Aid Miksalište and Info Park) to cease their distribution of food in the city center. Despite this pressure from the state, many volunteer groups continued in the Barracks throughout the winter.

In Belgrade, the relationship between independent and international assistance providers in the Barracks and the state remained fraught throughout the winter and ultimately culminated when the Serbian state evicted the residents from the structures in May, 2018, destroying the physical buildings after the residents left. At the time, [AYS](#) wrote of state officials were trying to “bargain with volunteers and grassroots organizations, dangling the idea of camp access” in

exchange for cooperation, “when this doesn’t work, force [was] threatened.” As two case studies, the “eviction” of Aid Brigade holds little similarity to the eviction of the Belgrade Barracks and the subsequent treatment of independent volunteer groups there. Nonetheless, when the underlying motivations of the state’s action in these two cases are understood, a similar trend can be observed. Additionally, in the case of assistance in the Barracks in Belgrade, one might observe that there were similar gaps between international volunteer groups and local assistance structures.

Miral Fire and fights

On the morning of June 1st, a fire broke out on the second floor of the IOM-run Miral Camp outside of Velika Kladuša. Nearly four hours after the fire started, the local fire department had the blaze under control. In total, at least [32 people were injured](#) in the fire, several of which suffered severe burns. 22 people were taken to the Cantonal Hospital in Bihać for treatment while 10 were taken to the local hospital in Velika Kladuša. Moreover, many camp residents reported losing clothes, sleeping bags, and personal belongings in the flames. Reports indicate that the fire may have been started by a faulty electrical outlet.



Miral camp burning on 1 June (AFP/Getty Images)

In the evening following the fire, a [large tent](#) was set up on the premises of Miral to accommodate the former residents of the second floor which had been rendered unusable. The IOM praised itself for a “[rapid evacuation](#)” during the incident and reported that it was attempting “[to get the part of the centre affected by fire habitable again as soon as possible.](#)”

In the days following, large [fights](#) broke, which some media outlets referred to as “[riots](#)”, between camp residents of differing national demographics. At least [twenty individuals were arrested](#) following these conflicts and [several will likely be deported to their home countries in the near future](#). In these fights, pre-existing tensions between camp residents were likely exacerbated by both the fire and the reconfiguration of living spaces. Commenting on the situation in Miral, the Director of BiH Service for Foreigners’ Affairs, Slobodan Ujic, framed this as a criminal issue, asking for a strong hand to prosecute “[illegal migrants committing crimes](#)”. He conspicuously failed to mention the fire, the dire psychological issues, poor camp conditions, and structural border violence which might have also contributed to the outbreak of this violence.

Following these fights, many North African camp residents were observed leaving Miral camp, to either seek shelter in Velika Kladuša, or in order to leave the town entirely. Rumors abounded in the aftermath of these fights, with some camp residents believing that certain demographics of people were no longer able to stay within the camp as residents.

This upheaval in Velika Kladuša comes at a time of broader struggles in the Una Sana Canton related to the capacity of institutional actors to manage the situation. This past month, the Bosnian Red Cross [warned](#) about the worsening situation in the region. “People are sleeping in parks, in car parks, on the footpath, and in dangerous buildings,” Indira Kulenovic, operations manager for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), said in a statement. “The situation is dire.”

Update on the situation in Serbia

Deaths in northern Serbia

Four individuals passed away in northern Serbia after attempting to enter Croatia irregularly through a truck on the 21st of May. The men were discovered when the driver of the truck opened the container and found the four men unconscious. Media reports written in the immediate aftermath of the incident describe only two of the group-members as passing away, however according to sources on the ground, in the days following the two other group-members passed away as well. Hospital officials in Novi Sad [reported](#) that the men died from heatstroke and suffocation while enclosed in the container.

Trends in Border violence

Bosnia-Herzegovina

(Non-)Seasonal tactics


When looking at the progression of tactics utilized by Croatian authorities during push-backs to BiH over the course of the last year, certain methods have been more frequently described by transit groups at any given time, others seem to be more subject to seasonal fluctuations. In several reports conducted in the month of May, the so-called “tunnel trick” was described a number of times:

“[...] the whole group was released at a small street with a slope on both sides on the Croatian side of the border with Bosnia near Velika Kladuša. [...]

The men were taken out of the van one by one, pushed down the slope at the side of the street towards the border and beaten with batons, fists and feet by police officers standing on both sides of the van’s door, shaping a confusing tunnel of beats, punches and kicks that the individuals had to pass through while stumbling down the slope. [...]

After having gone through it, the respondent waited at the foot of the slope for his friends to pass the "tunnel" [...]. (Report [1.9](#))

This is a tactic which was described frequently in testimonies of push-backs from Croatia to BiH in the summer and fall of 2018 and, to a lesser degree, over the winter as well.



While utilizing added techniques, such as flashlights to blind the individuals after getting out the transport vehicle and environmental features like downward sloping hills (which are numerous along the Bosnian/Croatian border) to make them stumble and fall during the procedure, the spatial structuring of one or two individuals passing through a “tunnel of beats, punches and kicks” from both sides can be seen as a basic element in the Croatian police’s repertoire of violence - an element more frequently used on the warming weather with the onset of summer.

Utilizing environmental conditions, however, seems to be applied regardless of the season - even though the effects of this tactic are disproportionately stronger during the winter. In the past month, we reported on two cases where individuals were pushed into rivers (see reports [1.5](#) und [2.1](#)), which was a commonly described practice during the winter months. Even though the near-freezing waterways back then presented a greater danger for people subjected to this treatment, push-back groups in warm weather still must endure the discomfort of sometimes 20 km walks back from the border in soaking clothing.

Push-back footage and the spectrum of perpetrators

A group with whom a report was conducted with this last month filmed a portion of their push-back from Croatia (see [1.8](#)). The [footage](#) depicts several group-members arguing with two Croatian officers over their mobile phones, which had been confiscated previously. The respondent described that the group’s asylum request were ignored and many of their belongings were taken by the authorities. One of the older group-members is shown sitting down, perhaps in protest, and telling the officer in front of him that if he was going to shoot, to shoot him in the head. Reportedly, Croatian authorities had threatened the group with guns when they had initially been apprehended. Eventually, the officer tells the group to leave, ostensibly across the border back to BiH, and the video ends.

What is perhaps most interesting in this footage is what is *not* shown. In many push-backs, respondents describe teams of police officers, dressed in black or dark blue uniforms, who utilize complex and violent tactics in order to force the push-back group over the border. The uniforms these officers are described as wearing closely match those worn by the Ministry of the Interior’s special *Interventna Policija*, as shown in the images below.



Interventna Policija (Intervention police)

Push-back footage from
December, 2018 near
Lohovo (BiH)

Sample image from a
training exercise



Officers conducting a push-back in December, from previously [published footage](#), wearing uniforms consistent with those worn by Interventna Policija, or Intervention Police

The footage from the last month, however, shows something less structured and less violent. The officer featured prominently in the video is not the tall, muscular, and intimidating male officer archetype described in many other push-back reports. Rather, the officer depicted in this video is an older and grey-haired man with a wiry frame. He does not carry himself with confidence, but almost seems unsure about what actions are expected in this situation. The officer is shown radioing to an unknown recipient, saying *“They saw the sign on the board and started getting wild”*. A short while later he radios again, telling the individual on the other end: *“It seems they realize they are again at zero point”*.



Temeljna Policija
(Regular police)

Push-back footage

Typical uniforms



The officer shown in this footage wore a uniform consistent with those worn by Croatia's Temeljna Policija, or regular police

The disparity between these officers - the professional Intervention police and the confused regular police officer - should serve to underscore the spectrum of actors and agents which are involved in push-backs from Croatia. Other reports, for example, regularly describe being apprehended by authorities in the interior wearing uniforms consistent with those worn by Croatia's *Specijalna Policija* (Special police). Although there may be repeated behavior, techniques, and perpetrators behind these acts, it would be a mistake to characterize these procedures as being perpetrated by the same people, in the same way, each and every time.

Detention cells in Croatia

Most of the testimonies of push-backs we document are described as occurring in remote and rural locations along the border area which are often vaguely described not immediately recognizable without the involved actors. Nonetheless, many push-back groups described being detained prior to their return to BiH in cells, police stations, and garages. These locations are comparatively more “identifiable” through their descriptions.

In our [April report](#), we published a summary of information we had collected on a garage at the Korenica police station being regularly used as an unsanitary, informal detention site for apprehended people-in-transit prior to being pushed back to BiH. People reported to be held in this poorly heated, dirty room en masse on a concrete floor, with restricted access to toilets and lacking the provision of blankets. Individuals described being detained there for several days and were able to provide detailed descriptions of the room which matched to the actual garage in Korenica - giving their testimonials even more credibility. The research on the garage was taken up by the Croatian news outlet [H-alter](#), who during its research also sent inquiries to the Croatian Ministry of the Interior about the case, followed by a request for direct action to the Croatian ombudsperson. Later, the Ministry of the Interior responded denying any breaches of protocol, describing that police officers on two occasions during April and May this year dealt with larger groups of persons found to be illegally crossing the state border. They further described that people were brought to the Korenica police station by official vehicles for criminal investigation and were under the supervision of police officers in the fenced yard of the police station beside the garages, under the claim that the detention facilities did not have the capacity to hold a larger group of people. They defended this decision by citing adverse weather conditions, describing it as an act of empathy from some police officers who took out vehicles from one of the garage rooms so that the people who were outdoors in the yard would enter the room and thus be prone to wind and cold, until the end criminal investigation.

In the course of the last month, footage of two other, similar detention sites were obtained. These locations serve as an important cog within the greater push-back machine. The first is a cell in (or near) the police station in Slunj (HR) and has been mentioned in our reports frequently over the past year as a place where [people were detained for reportedly up to 24 hours](#) preceding push-backs from Croatia to BiH.



Detention cell in Slunj (HR)

The image shows a harshly lit, windowless room with neither floor isolation nor seating accommodation but detainees sleeping on blankets on concrete floor.

Similarly unsanitary detention facilities can be seen in the second piece of footage from this month documenting detention facilities, in a detention cell in the area of Zadar County (HR). In the [footage](#), the individual filming explains and shows that neither food, access to toilets, blankets, room heating or medical treatment was provided. An Iranian family which was present during the filming and who the corresponding [testimony](#) about the push-back was taken from described that they were detained there for 24 hours.

The mentioned facilities do not appear to be in accordance with the [requirements](#) related to the reception of applicants for international protection (which are part of the framework of the [Common European Asylum System](#)), especially regarding the detention of vulnerable groups

like women and children. Nonetheless, we are unable to assess conclusively whether the inappropriate conditions detainees are experiencing should be attributed to negligence and logistic difficulties or interpreted as a fixed component of the deterrent measures applied during pushback procedures in the country.

The push-back highway from Slovenia to Velika Kladuša

Chain push-backs from Slovenia to BiH are conducted routinely in the border areas outside of the Una-Sana Canton. In the time period between June 2018 and May 2019, we have collected 62 testimonies of push-backs from Slovenia to BiH, representing over 350 individuals pushed back from Slovenia to BiH in the span of a year. Of these 62 testimonies of chain push-backs, it is interesting to note that the vast majority (roughly 95%) of the groups report being pushed back in the general vicinity (within 20 km) of Velika Kladuša. After conducting a year of violence reports in BiH, it is worth looking at this phenomenon and the intimate relationship that the border areas outside of Velika Kladuša share with these practices.

While direct push-backs from Croatia are generally spread out along the border areas of the Una-Sana Canton (to areas surrounding Bihac, Sturlic, or Velika Kladuša), chain push-backs from Slovenia are frequently described as being conducted near Velika Kladuša. In the last two months (April - May 2019), 49% (15 out of 29) of the reports of direct push-backs from Croatia to BiH in the past month were in the general area of Velika Kladuša. In contrast, 100% (14 out of 14) of the report of chain push-backs from Slovenia to BiH in the past month were in the general area of Velika Kladuša.



When looking at the geography of the region, the rationalization for these behavior is apparent, given that Velika Kladuša is the nearest geographical point to Slovenia in all of BiH. In other words, it is the quickest drive for authorities rushing from the Slovenia-Croatia border to return groups to BiH. Many of these reports describe the push-back groups being transported from the Novo Mesto or Črnomelj police station (among others), being transported across the Metlika border crossing (alternatively the Obrežje border crossing outside of Zagreb) and given over to Croatian authorities, who later drive them down the D1 and D6 highways past Karlovac and towards Vojnic before continuing towards the border areas around Velika Kladuša. For an in-depth analysis of the procedures within Slovenia, one might look to the [report](#) published by Info Kolpa in Slovenia last month.

A series of three reports on a Slovenian push-back from this past month exemplifies this behavior. The three reports chronicle the journey of a lone Iranian man , two Afghan men, and nine Pakistani men (see [2.2](#), [2.3](#), & [2.4](#) respectively), all apprehended at different times and places in Slovenia yet ultimately pushed back to BiH near Velika Kladuša together on the same night. While focusing specifically on chain push-backs to BiH in this case, it should be understood that this practice of chain push-backs to Serbia from Slovenia has also been observed regularly.

Montenegro

Although push-backs from BiH to Montenegro have not been documented for as long of a period of time as those from Croatia, the evidence we have at our disposal indicates a lesser degree of intentionality. Previous reports describe push-back groups re-attempting to cross the Bosnian-Montenegrin borders shortly after their push-backs, with little hassle from BiH authorities. This is enabled in part because these push-back groups often are able to retain enough gear, money, and energy through the course of the push-back to enable a second (or third) attempt to transit towards Sarajevo. Furthermore, in many cases, these groups retain their phones, enabling GPS guidance on their way through the forest. This contrasts with many Croatian push-backs in which phones, gear, and money are typically confiscated or destroyed, making repeated and immediate transit attempts less practical. Additionally, Bosnian authorities seems to be less diligent in the apprehension of transit groups, in several cases only managing to stop a portion of a group and subsequently not making concerted efforts to catch the others.

The lack of systematized physical violence in these procedures results in lower emotional and physical costs incurred by this treatment, perhaps enabling groups to rapidly repeat transit attempts. Respondents have typically only reported experiencing violence from BiH authorities in cases where one or several individuals protested against the treatment: a form of violence that serves more as a direct enforcement measure than as a systematic deterrence.

Since phones are less targeted during push-backs to Montenegro, Bosnian authorities have also had more difficulties in covering their tracks than authorities in Croatia who are more diligent with incapacitating or confiscating smartphones. People-in-transit pushed back from Bosnia to Montenegro have been able to film during or after the push-backs which led to the publication of two significant videos - one [filmed just after a pushback near Trebinje \(BiH\)](#), the other one in a [detention cell near the border crossing point Klobuk \(BiH\)](#) - in April.

Nonetheless, practices of more systematic pushbacks in the region (particularly those in Croatia and Hungary) often developed from an initial phase of non-intervention to a gradual escalation of violence and aggression, leading to the established repertoires of border violence utilized in these countries. Even though the Bosnian border with Montenegro does not constitute an EU or Schengen border, its central position along the current Balkan Route endows the border with an elevated importance for EU politicians looking to curb irregular border crossings in the region. Speculating about the future process of externalization of EU borders, we consider it important to question whether the Bosnian border with Montenegro border might one day manifest a similar modality of violence as Croatian and Hungarian borders.

Serbia

While the reports covered in this monthly document typically focus on cross-border push-backs and border violence, it is important to also consider the instances of violence which occur “before the borders”. In Serbia, in particular, reports of authorities utilizing unnecessary force on refugees and migrants approaching the Croatian border are common. This past month, an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan returned from the Batrovci border crossing near Šid (SRB) with broken bones after being assaulted by two Serbian border authorities who beat the man after finding him and his friend hiding in the container of a truck.



17-year-old "I.'s" broken arm after the internal border violence incident

While this border violence “before the borders” may not have the same legal implications as it relates to asylum law, it remains just as cruel for the human beings which must endure this reality of violence on a daily basis.

Glossary of May, 2019 reports

This month we conducted 23 reports of push-backs in total. 15 of these were incidents of push-backs to BiH (9 directly from Croatia and 6 chain push-backs from Slovenia), 3 of these were incidents of push-backs to Serbia from Croatia, and 5 of these were incidents of push-backs from BiH to Montenegro. The reports were conducted with a wide demographic variety of respondents ranging from families to single men to unaccompanied minors. The respondents to these reports also originate from a wide variety of countries such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Algeria, and Morocco, to name a few.

Report link	Date of Report	Date of Incident	Group Size	Countries of origin
<i>Push-backs from Croatia to BiH</i>				
<u>1.1</u>	24/05/2019	April 4, 2019	4	Syria, Morocco, Algeria
<u>1.2</u>	17/05/2019	April 25, 2019	3	Algeria
<u>1.3</u>	17/05/2019	April 19, 2019	3	Algeria
<u>1.4</u>	24/05/2019	April 28, 2019	8	Iran
<u>1.5</u>	17/05/2019	May 1, 2019	3	Algeria
<u>1.6</u>	19/05/2019	May 13, 2019	9	Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon
<u>1.7</u>	18/05/2019	May 16, 2019	3	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Morocco
<u>1.8</u>	29/05/2019	May 26, 2019	7	Palestine, Syria
<u>1.9</u>	31/05/2019	May 8, 2019	24	Algeria, Pakistan
<i>Push-backs from Slovenia to BiH</i>				

2.1	16/05/2019	April 21, 2019	7	Algeria, Morocco
2.2	07/05/2019	May 3, 2019	1	Iran
2.3	07/05/2019	May 4, 2019	2	Afghanistan
2.4	07/05/2019	May 5, 2019	9	Pakistan
2.5	15/05/2019	May 11, 2019	4	Algeria
2.6	15/05/2019	May 8, 2019	4	Syria, Algeria
<i>Push-backs from Croatia to Serbia</i>				
3.1	01/05/2019	April 28, 2019	3	Morocco, Algeria
3.2	14/05/2019	May 11, 2019	1	Tunisia
3.3	25/05/2019	May 15, 2019	2	Afghanistan
<i>Push-backs from BiH to Montenegro</i>				
4.1	17/05/2019	May 9, 2019	9	Syria
4.2	21/05/2019	May 17, 2019	15	Kurdish - Iraq
4.3	21/05/2019	May 17, 2019	4	Afghanistan, Pakistan
4.4	22/05/2019	May 18, 2019	4	Pakistan
4.5	21/05/2019	May 19, 2019	5	Syria